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Abstract

PSA Certified is an independent security evaluation scheme for Platform Security Architecture (PSA) based chips, system software and for connected devices, including IoT, Edge devices, industrial and automotive applications. It establishes trust through a multi-level assurance program for chips containing a security component called a Root of Trust that provides trusted functionality to the platform. The multi-level scheme has been designed to help device makers and businesses get the level of security they need for their use case.

This document covers PSA Certified™ Level 1 which builds on the PSA Security Model and its goals, generic compute-based platform threat models and industry best practice to provide a set of critical security questions for the chip vendor, the system software supplier and the device OEM. Use this form to fill in the questionnaire for your product and review it with one of the JSA member Evaluation Laboratories. Products that become PSA Certified will be showcased on www.psacertified.org website. PSA and PSA Certified are architecture neutral.

This version includes certification options covering the United Kingdom Product Security and Telecommunica­tions Infrastructure Act, the adopted text of the European Union Cyber Resiliency Act, the work in progress Radio Equipment Directive cyber-security requirements, and NIST 8425 in the context of the USA Cyber Trust Mark.

Keywords

PSA Certified Level 1, certification, chip, connected device, internet, IoT, Platform Security Architecture, questionnaire, PSA, security, system software, device, Cyber Resiliency Act, Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act, Radio Equipment Directive, Cyber Trust Mark.

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# About this document

## Current Status and Anticipated Changes

Current Status: V3.1 BETA 01

## Release Information

The change history table lists the changes that have been made to this document.

| Date | Version | Confidentiality | Change |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 31/07/2024 | 3.1 BETA 01 | Non-confidential | Inclusion of NISTIR 8425 and its use by the FCC for the US Cyber Trust Mark, updates for EU-CRA and RED |
| 10/11/2023 | 3.0 BETA 01 | Non-confidential | Update on the requirements due to regulations included in new section 7. |
| 18/05/2022 | 2.2 REL01 | Non-confidential | Clarifications and enhancements. Draft alignment with Matter and ioXt. |
| 30/09/2021 | 2.1 REL02 | Non-confidential | Clarification on questionnaire reuse, minor clarifications, some now optional, removal of examples, alignment with web version. |
| 22/02/2021 | 2.1 REL01 | Non-confidential | Minor refinements and clarifications based on evaluation submission feedback. |
| 21/08/2020 | 2.1 Beta | Non-confidential | Updates and alignment with ETSI 303 645 and NISTIR 8259A. Addresses devices using application type processors. Change in compositional model for devices on system software on chips. |
| 10/02/2020 | 2.0 Beta | Non-confidential | Updates and alignment with ETSI 303 645, NISTIR 8259 and SB-327 standards |
| 30/10/2019 | 1.2 | Non-confidential | Clarifications for possible evaluation scopes and alignments with PSA Certified Level 2 |
| 01/04/2019 | 1.1 | Non-confidential | Clarifications on PSA Functional API Certification and PSA Functional APIs |
| 13/02/2019 | 1.0 | Non-confidential | Public release based on BET03 version |

## References

This document refers to the following informative documents.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ref | Doc No | Author(s) | Title | |
|  | JSADEN 0014 | ARM | Platform Security Model |
|  | EN 303 645 | ETSI | Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things; V2.1.1 (2020-06) |
|  | NISTIR 8259A | NIST | IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline; May 2020 |
|  | Bill No. 327; Chapter 886. | California State Senate | Security of Connected Devices |
|  |  | UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology[[1]](#footnote-2) | [Proposals for regulating consumer smart product cyber security](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proposals-for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views/proposals-for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views). |
|  | 23-27349-003 | Connectivity Standards Alliance | Matter 1.2 Core Specification |
|  |  | ioXt alliance | ioXt 2021 Base Profile, version 2 |
|  | [COM(2022) 454 final 2022/0272 (COD)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:864f472b-34e9-11ed-9c68-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF) | European Commission (Cyber Resiliency Act) | Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council oh horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation EU 2019/1020. |
|  | [15.9.2022 COM(2022) 454 ANNEXES 1 to 6](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:864f472b-34e9-11ed-9c68-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF) | European Commission (Cyber Resiliency Act) | ANNEXES to the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council oh horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation EU 2019/1020 |
|  | [Interinstitutional File: 2022/0272(COD)](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11726-2023-INIT/en/pdf) | Council of the European Union (Cyber Resiliency Act) | Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital element and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/102 |
|  |  | UK Government | [The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable products) Regulations 2023.](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-product-security-and-telecommunications-infrastructure-product-security-regime) |
|  | [Directive 2014/53/EU](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0053) | European Union (Radio Equipment Directive) | [DIRECTIVE 2014/53/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0053) |
|  | [Directive 2022/2380](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2380) | European Union (Radio Equipment Directive) | [DIRECTIVE (EU) 2022/2380 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 November 2022 amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022L2380) |
|  | [C(2022) 5637 Final Main document C(2022)5637\_0.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=C(2022)5637&lang=en) | European Commission (Radio Equipment Directive) | [COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION of 5.8.2022 on a standardisation request to the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation as regards radio equipment in support of Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30](https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=C(2022)5637&lang=en) |
|  | [C(2022) 5637 Final Annex 1 of 1 C(2022)5637\_1.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=C(2022)5637&lang=en) | European Commission (Radio Equipment Directive) | [ANNEXES to the Commission Implementing Decision on a standardisation request to the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation as regards radio equipment in support of Directive 2014/53/EU of the](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwisseSfydmBAxVXUkEAHYm7AhgQFnoECBIQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Ftransparency%2Fdocuments-register%2Fdetail%3Fref%3DC(2022)5637%26lang%3Den&usg=AOvVaw2wySWhabZIsjTnoiVKbl0y&opi=89978449) the Council and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 |
|  | SP800-57 Part 1 r5 | NIST | Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 – General |
|  | NISTIR 8425 | NIST | Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products |
|  | [FCC 23-65](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-65A1.pdf) | Federal Communications Commission | In the Matter of Cybersecurity Labeling for Internet of Things. PS Docket No. 23-239 |
|  | [P9\_TA(2024)0130](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/search/simpleSearchHome.htm?references=P9_TA(2024)0130&sortAndOrder=DATE_DOCU_DESC) | European Parliament (Cyber Resiliency Act) | European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2022)0454 – C9-0308/2022 – 2022/0272(COD)) |
|  | [L 218/82 13.8.2008](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008D0768) | European Union (Conformity Assessment) | Decision 768/2008/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC |

## Terms and Abbreviations

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Term | Meaning |
| Application Root of Trust Service(s) | Application specific security service(s) that are not defined by PSA. Such services execute in the Secure Processing Environment and are required to be in Secure Partitions. |
| Application Specific Software | Software that provides the functionality required of the specific device. This software runs in the Non-Secure Processing Environment, making use of the System Software, Application RoT Services and PSA-RoT Services. |
| Best Practice Cryptography | Use of cryptographic algorithms, modes and protocols, key generation and random number generation approved by a government or by an industry body in the intended deployment market(s). Use of cryptographic algorithms with a cryptographic strength suitable for the expected lifetime of the device should be used. Where possible, the ability to change the algorithms in use should be considered. |
| Critical Security Parameter | Secret information, with integrity and confidentiality requirements, that is used to maintain device security, such as authentication data (passwords, PIN, certificates), secret cryptographic keys, etc. Critical Security parameters are considered to be Sensitive Data. In some contexts, these data are classed as assets. |
| Evaluation Laboratory | Laboratory or facility that performs the technical review of questionnaires submitted for Level 1 PSA certification. The list of evaluation laboratories participating to PSA Certified can be found on www.psacertified.org |
| Factory Reset | Factory reset means reset to any state that might be as delivered from the manufacturer, for example, including any manufacturer provided updates after the initial delivery of the device. |
| Hardware Unique Key (HUK) | Secret and unique to the device symmetric key that must not be accessible outside the PSA Root of Trust. It is a critical security parameter. |
| Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) | The processing environment that executes the non-secure System Software and Application Specific Software. PSA requires the NSPE to be isolated from the SPE. Isolation between partitions within the NSPE is not required by PSA though is encouraged where supported. |
| Partition | The logical boundary of a software entity with intended interaction only via defined interfaces, but not necessarily isolated from software in other partitions. Note that both the NSPE and SPE may host partitions. |
| PSA | Platform Security Architecture |
| PSA Certification Body | The entity that receives applications for PSA security certification, issues certificates, maintains the security certification scheme, and ensures consistency across all the evaluation laboratories. |
| PSA Certified API | PSA defined Application Programming Interfaces on which security services can be built. APIs defined so far include Crypto, Secure Storage and Attestation. |
| PSA Certified API Certification | Functional certification confirms that the device implements the PSA Certified APIs correctly by passing the PSA Certified API Certification test suites. |
| PSA Root of Trust (PSA-RoT) | The PSA defined combination of the Immutable Platform Root of Trust and the Updateable Platform Root of Trust, and which is the most trusted security component on the device. See [1]. |
| Immutable Platform Root of Trust | The minimal set of hardware, firmware and data of the PSA-RoT, which is inherently trusted because it cannot be modified following manufacture. There is no software at a deeper level that can verify that it as authentic and unmodified. |
| Updateable Platform Root of Trust | The firmware, software and data of the PSA-RoT that can be securely updated following manufacture. |
| Personally Identifiable Data | Information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. Such data is considered to be Sensitive Data if disclosure or modification causes harm to the identified individual. |
| Platform Root of Trust Service(s) | PSA defined security services for use by PSA-RoT, Application RoT Service(s) and by the NSPE. Executes in the Secure Processing Environment and may use Trusted Subsystems. This includes the services offered by the PSA Certified APIs. |
| Secure Partition | A Partition in the Secure Processing Environment. |
| Secure Processing Environment Partition Management | Management of the execution of software in Secure Partitions. Typical implementations will provide scheduling and inter-partition communication mechanisms. Implementations may also enforce isolation between the managed Secure Partitions. |
| Secure Processing Environment (SPE) | The processing environment that executes the PSA-RoT, the PSA-RoT Services, and any Application RoT Service(s). |
| Secure Boot | The process of verifying and validating the integrity and authenticity of updateable firmware and software components as a pre-requisite to their execution. This must apply to all the firmware and software in the SPE. It should also apply to the first NSPE image loaded, which may extend the NSPE secure boot chain further. |
| System Software | NSPE software that may comprise an operating system or some run-time executive, together with any middleware, standard stacks and libraries, chip specific device drivers, etc., but not the application specific software. |
| Sensitive Data | Any data that if, for example, is disclosed or modified, could result in a device vulnerability, jeopardize any service that relies on it, or cause harm to an identifiable individual. |
| Trusted subsystem | A security subsystem that the PSA-RoT relies on for protection of its critical security parameters, or that implements some of its services. |

## Feedback

The PSA JSA Members welcome feedback on its documentation.

If you have comments on the content of this documentation, send an e-mail to psacertified@arm.com. Give:

* The title (PSA Certified Level 1 Questionnaire).
* The number (JSADEN-001) and version.
* The page numbers to which your comments apply.
* The rule identifiers to which your comments apply, if applicable.
* A concise explanation of your comments.

PSA JSA Members also welcome general suggestions for additions and improvements.

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# PSA Certified Overview

## PSA Overview

PSA defines a common hardware and software security platform, providing a generic security foundation allowing secure products and features to be deployed.

### PSA Certified

The PSA Certified scheme involves the mandatory evaluation against a set of security requirements by an Evaluation Laboratory. The evaluation laboratory examines security measures to ensure that the device, including its critical security parameters, is not vulnerable to identified threats.

The scheme recognizes that there will be different security requirements and different cost and security trade-offs for different applications and ecosystems. This is reflected in specifications by introducing a range of *assurance levels*.

PSA Certified Level 1 assurance, the target of this document, relies on questionnaires filled out by the Chip vendor (section 4), the System Software vendor (section 5) or the Device OEM (section 6). The questionnaires defined in this document cover the baseline security requirements to mitigate common threats and security requirements for PSA based products. The Evaluation Laboratory relies on this questionnaire to examine the security measures.

Example answers for the questions can be found in the web-based version of this document, which can be found at [certify.psacertified.org](https://certify.psacertified.org/).

In the case of a successful evaluation a digital certificate is issued by the PSA Certification Body for that certification, which can optionally be published on [www.psacertified.org](http://www.psacertified.org). The certificate number is a globally unique EAN-13 number that can be supplied by the Evaluation Laboratory or by the company seeking certification. PSA devices that support, for example, an IETF Entity Attestation Token[[2]](#footnote-3) can include the EAN-13 to inform relying parties that the chip, system software or device has been evaluated and is PSA Certified.

### PSA Certified API Certification

PSA Certified APICertification, which is optional, means that a device has implemented the [PSA Certified API](https://pages.arm.com/psa-apis.html)[[3]](#footnote-4) and passed the PSA Certified APICertification test suites. The PSA Certified APIs cover three security functions: Attestation, Cryptography and Secure Storage. A step-by-step guide for getting a product PSA Certified APIcertified is available on [www.psacertified.org/resources](http://www.psacertified.org/resources).

## Scope for Security Evaluation

There are three evaluation scopes: the chip, the system software and the device. The security evaluation covers the combination of the hardware and software components. Figure 1 illustrates the typical components in the PSA architecture and the related evaluation scopes. This figure distinguishes a Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) and a Secure Processing Environment (SPE), for which the Chip level shall provide isolation[[4]](#footnote-5).



Figure 1: Logical Scope of Chip, System Software and Device Levels

The Chip security evaluation scope includes the following Secure Processing Environment PSA-RoT elements, see also [1]:

* Immutable Platform Root of Trust, for example, the Boot ROM, any root parameters, the NSPE/SPE isolation hardware, and any hardware-based security lifecycle management and enforcement.
* Updateable Platform Root of Trust, for example, a main bootloader, the code that implements the SPE Partition Management function, the code that implements the PSA defined services[[5]](#footnote-6) such as attestation, secure storage, and cryptography.
* Any Trusted subsystems that the PSA-RoT relies on for protection of its assets, or that implement some of its services.

The Chip scope hardware may be a System-on-Chip or a System-in-Package, possibly supported by board level trusted subsystem components, for example, a Secure Element or Subscriber Identification Module.

The System Software in the scope of the security evaluation executes in the Non-secure Processing Environment. System Software evaluation dependencies on the Chip layer are detailed in section 2.4.

For the Device, the scope of the security evaluation includes the following software components:

* Applications and any other software developed by the OEM. These may execute in the Non-Secure Processing Environment or as Application Root of Trust Services in the Secure Processing Environment
* Configuration of the System Software for the device.

Device evaluation dependencies on the System Software and Chip layers are detailed in section 2.4.

## Roles for PSA Certified Level 1

PSA Certified Level 1 involves the following roles:

* Chip Vendor: Develops the chip, the immutable and updateable parts of the PSA-RoT (including any trusted subsystems).
* System Software Vendor: Develops the system software for the Non-secure Processing Environment.
* Device OEM: Conceives and develops a device based on the PSA specifications.
* Evaluation Laboratory: Performs the technical review of questionnaire(s) submitted for PSA Certified Level 1 and if successful provides a digital certificate reference number (EAN-13) for the applicable evaluation scope.
* Certification Body: The entity that receives applications for PSA certification, issues certificates, maintains the security certification scheme, and ensures consistency across the evaluation laboratories.

## Options for Evaluation and Layer Composition

The purpose of PSA Certified Level 1 is to assess the security foundation of a device. The certification scheme is organized in layers: device, on top of the system software, on top of the chip. The certificate for a given layer is only applicable if the lower layers have either been separately evaluated and hold a PSA L1 certificate or, if not, are covered in the evaluation that leads to the considered certificate. The evaluation options are as follows;

1. Chip evaluation can proceed independently of the other layers. Section 4 must be filled in.
2. System Software evaluation can proceed with one of the following;
   1. with a PSA Certified chip. Section 5 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the chip EAN-13.
   2. with an uncertified chip the evaluation must also include the chip part. Sections 4 and 5 must be filled in. Note that an independent certificate for the chip will not be issued.
3. Device evaluation can proceed with one of the following;
   1. on PSA Certified system software with either;
      1. a valid PSA Certified chip other than that declared in the system software certificate; see section 2.4.2 on validity. Section 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the system software EAN-13 and the PSA Certified chip EAN-13. Section 3.8 also must be filled in.
      2. the chip declared in the system software certificate. Section 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the system software EAN-13, and the named chip. If the named chip is PSA Certified, section 3.3 must give the chip EAN-13.
   2. on uncertified system software with a PSA Certified chip. The evaluation must include the system software part. Sections 5 and 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the EAN-13 of the PSA Certified chip. An independent certificate for the system software will not be issued.
   3. if the chip is neither a valid PSA Certified chip (it does not have its own certificate) nor the chip named in any certificate for the System Software[[6]](#footnote-7) then the evaluation must include both the system software and the chip parts. Sections 4, 5 and 6 must be filled in. Note that independent certificates for the system software and for the chip will not be issued.

Certification of a device requires the device vendor to confirm that the device and any device vendor configuration of the system software results in the correct use of the PSA-RoT. Confirmation is accessed via the device Developer responses in section 6. The optional PSA Certified APIcertification can help in this process. Device evaluation is performed with a specific system software and chip combination, and the resulting device certificate is valid for that combination only.

From version 3.0, the vendor may choose to have their solution evaluated in the context of the regulations covered in section 7. In this case, the vendor must complete the required part or parts of section 7.

### Options for submission directly to the PSA Certification Body

Where a product is developed from one already PSA Certified and the exact same questionnaire answers and declarations are applicable, then section 3.7 can be completed instead of the sections stated above and submitted directly to the PSA Certification Body. Checking for acceptability with the PSA Certification Body or chosen Evaluation Laboratory is recommended. Section 3.7 can be used in the following situations;

* a new Chip uses the same certified PSA-RoT implementation,
* updated certified System Software on the same Chip declared in the referenced certification,
* a new device using the same System Software and Chip declared in the referenced certification.

### Valid Alternative PSA Certified Chips

Flexible composition via 3)a)i) above relies on the interchangeability of the chip level PSA-RoT. Typically, this means that the alternate PSA Certified chip must support at least the same PSA-RoT functionality as the chip named in the System Software certificate. In practice, this likely means that all the requirements in section 4 must be met. PSA Certified APICertification can be used as evidence of interchangeability.

If the PSA Certified System Software relies on chip-level security functionality in addition to that required for the PSA-RoT then the alternative chip must provide at least the same additional functionality. In practice, this is likely to mean that such compositions may be difficult.

The full rules on validity can be found at [www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/silicon-vendor/overview/level-1/questionnaire-composition](http://www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/silicon-vendor/overview/level-1/questionnaire-composition).

## Process for PSA Certified Level 1

The process for Level 1 certification is the following:

1. The Chip Vendor, the System Software Vendor or the Device OEM (all named Developer below) complete the relevant questionnaire provided in sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 as specified in section 2.4. It is recommended that the Developer also complete the assessable organizational best practices questions in Appendix A.1.
2. For each requirement in the relevant section, a single box corresponding to the fulfilment of the requirement is ticked (or marked in an equivalent way) as follows, note that a gray box means that answer is not acceptable. All guidance given in italic should be deleted.
   * Yes: for full compliance with the requirement, the Developer describes how this requirement is met according to any guidance given *in italic*.
   * Partial: for partial compliance with the requirement, the Developer describes how the requirement is partially met according to any guidance given *in italic* and what impact that has on the security.
   * N/A: where the requirement is not applicable for one of the following reasons, the Developer must in all cases provide a rationale;

* the required feature is not supported (typically those requirements that start with “if”), or
* is an Optional requirement and is not included.

1. The Developer fills the assessment information part in Section 3 and submits the applicable questionnaire(s), according to the selected scope of evaluation, to an Evaluation Laboratory.
2. The Evaluation Laboratory performs the technical review by checking that the rationale given for each requirement is consistent with the statement of the requirement. The Evaluation Laboratory may ask for clarification. The Evaluation Laboratory submits an application to the PSA Certification Body on behalf of the Developer.
3. If the result of the review by the Evaluation Laboratory is Pass, the Evaluation Laboratory will provide an EAN-13 for the relevant Chip, System Software or Device certification (see section 2.4), if not already provided by the Developer.
4. The PSA Certification Body proceeds to the certification of the product and the EAN-13 is published along with product reference on the Certification Body website.

The pass threshold for each section of Chip, System Software or Device is at most one (1) question not answered in conformance with the “Expected answer” on the marking sheet of Appendix D with a rationale of why security is unaffected. Requirements marked as Optional must not be considered in the count.

For a variant of an existing certified product, the Developer can reuse the questionnaire that was reviewed by the Evaluation Laboratory provided exactly the same answers and declarations apply (see section 3.7). In that case, no action from an Evaluation Laboratory is required and the Developer only has to submit an application to the PSA Certification Body and outline how the changes do not impact the security relative to the original certified product. The EAN-13 for the new product will differ from the product already certified.

## Operational Environment Assumptions

The following assumptions hold regarding the operational environment of the device target of the evaluation:

* The device manufacturing process ensures integrity and authenticity of the hardware design and any software components.
* Generation, storage, distribution, destruction, injection of secret data in the device enforces integrity and confidentiality of these data. In particular, private keys are not shared among devices.
* The device and related software, including third-party libraries, is subject to a vulnerability watch and a responsible disclosure program. Vulnerabilities are subject to timely security patches and customers notified.
* The OEM has performed a risk assessment for the applications supported by the device to identify and protect assets used by the device, has followed coding best practices, and has performed functional testing.

# Assessment Information

The vendor applying for PSA certification shall fill all applicable parts of this section.

## Contact

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Company activity: | *(State whether Device (OEM) vendor, System Software Vendor or Chip Vendor)* |
| Company name: |  |
| Contact name: |  |
| Contact title: |  |
| Contact email: |  |
| Contact address: |  |
| Contact phone: |  |

## Scope of Evaluation

Check the box for the scope for this evaluation (see section 2.4):

* Chip.
* System Software on a PSA Certified chip*.*
* System Software on an uncertified chip.
* Device on PSA Certified system software but with a valid PSA Certified chip other than that named in the system software certificate. The declaration in section 3.8 must be completed.
* Device on PSA Certified system software with the chip named in the system software certificate.
* Device on an uncertified system software on a PSA Certified chip.
* Device on system software and on an uncertified chip*.*

Check the boxes below if the scope of evaluation is to cover compliance with any of the regulations in section 7.

* UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act (section 7.1)
* EU Cyber Resiliency Act (section 7.2)
* Radio Equipment Directive (section 7.3)

## Product Reference

This declaration is applicable for a Chip evaluation;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Commercial name: | *(e.g., Product family)* |
| Chip part number: |  |
| Chip version: | *(e.g., Chip silicon revision)* |
| SPE name: | *(e.g., Firmware Framework-M)* |
| SPE version: |  |
| Chip EAN-13: | *(If this version of the chip is already PSA Certified, specify the EAN-13 of the certificate)* |
| Chip reference documentation: | *(If this version of the chip is not PSA Certified, provide identification of the reference documentation used to fill the questionnaire, such as chip datasheet, detailed fact sheet or reference manual. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)* |
| Vulnerability disclosure policy: | *(If a vulnerability disclosure policy is available for this product, provide the URL for retrieval. See Appendix A.1.)* |

This declaration is applicable for a System Software evaluation;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| System Software name: | *(e.g., Mbed OS, Linux)* |
| System Software version: | The version number or an identifier for the build of the system software. |
| System Software EAN-13: | *(If this version of the System Software is already PSA Certified, specify the EAN-13 of the certificate)* |
| System Software reference documentation: | *(If this version of the System Software is not PSA Certified, provide identification of the reference documentation used to fill the System Software questionnaire. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)* |
| System Software use of chip security features: | *(Please indicate what use is made of chip-level security functionality in addition to that required for the PSA-RoT. See section 2.4.2)* |
| Vulnerability disclosure policy: | *(If a vulnerability disclosure policy is available for this product, provide the URL for retrieval. See Appendix A.1.)* |
| Information and Instructions: | *(If user information and instructions are available for this product, provide the URL for retrieval.)* |

This declaration is applicable for a Device evaluation;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Device name: | *(e.g., Smart Camera, Model123)* |
| Device version: | *(The version number or an identifier for the build of the device, including the software)* |
| Device EAN-13: | *(If this version of the Device is already PSA Certified, specify the EAN-13 of the certificate)* |
| Device reference documentation: | *(If this version of the Device is not PSA Certified, provide identification of the reference documentation used to fill the Device questionnaire. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)* |
| Device use of chip security features: | *(Please indicate what use is made of chip-level security functionality in addition to that required for the PSA-RoT. See section 2.4.2)* |
| Vulnerability disclosure policy: | *(If a vulnerability disclosure policy is available for this product, provide the URL for retrieval. See Appendix A.1.)* |
| Information and Instructions: | *(If user information and instructions are available for this product, provide the URL for retrieval.)* |

## Device Product Description

This declaration applies for a Device evaluation.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Expected usage: |  |
| Features: | *(Describe the functional and security features marketed for the product)* |
| Description of expected operational environment: | *(Describe if any actors and external resources are required for operation of the product, and the related security assumptions)* |

## PSA RoT Implementation

For Chip evaluation:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified API certification: | *PSA Certified API Certification is optional.*  *If PSA API tests have been performed, then provide the output reports to the Evaluation Laboratory.* |
| PSA Security Model Isolation Boundaries | Isolation of the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) from the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) is a mandatory PSA Certified requirement. The PSA Security Model [1] defines two incremental isolation boundaries; please indicate if these are deployed;   * The PSA-RoT is isolated from the Application RoT Service(s). * In addition to PSA-RoT isolation from Application RoT Service(s), Application RoT Services are isolated from each other. |
| PSA-RoT Services: | *(Describe PSA-RoT services implementation)* |
| Trusted subsystem: | *(Describe any trusted subsystems relied upon for operation of PSA Root of Trust, such as a security subsystem or a Secure Element, and how they are used. Declare ‘none’ if no trusted subsystems are used)* |
| Entropy Source | *(List any applied random number specification or conformance tests of the entropy source. This information will be included in the certificate.)* |

## Declaration for new questionnaire

This declaration applies for a questionnaire that has not yet been reviewed by an Evaluation Laboratory.

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that:

* The information provided in sections 4, 5, or 6, as required and selected in section 3.2, of this questionnaire is valid and correct for the product/service stated in Section 3.3.
* The information provided in the applicable parts of section 7, as selected in section 3.2, of this questionnaire is valid and correct for the product stated in section 3.3.

and

* I acknowledge and accept the instructions, exclusions and other provisions set out in this document.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name: |  |
| Date: |  |
| Signature: |  |

## Declaration for reuse of an existing questionnaire

This declaration applies for a product that reuses the exact same questionnaire answers and any declarations that have already been reviewed by an Evaluation Laboratory and for which the related product has passed PSA Certified. In that case, the Vendor does not have to fill again the relevant Section 4, 5, or 6 of this questionnaire and no action from an Evaluation Laboratory is required. The vendor can apply directly to the PSA Certification Body. See section 2.4.1.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| EAN-13 of the product that passed PSA Certified: |  |

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that:

* The information provided in the questionnaire for the product referenced above that is PSA Certified is also valid and correct for the product/service stated in section 3.3.

and

* I acknowledge and accept the instructions, exclusions and other provisions set out in this document.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name: |  |
| Date: |  |
| Signature: |  |

## Declaration of conformance for a Device level certificate

If the Device developer is reusing a valid PSA Certified chip and PSA Certified system software for composition following 3)a)i) on page 16, the EAN-13 of the certificates should be declared below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified Chip EAN-13 |  |
| PSA Certified System Software EAN-13 |  |

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that the information provided in this section is valid and correct for the product/service stated in section 3.3.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name: |  |
| Date: |  |
| Signature: |  |

# Chip Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to the hardware and firmware that comprise the PSA-RoT that forms the Secure Processing Environment (SPE), see sections 1.4 and 2.2. Skip this section if the version of the chip referred in Section 3.3 is already PSA Certified. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

When this section is filled by the System Software Vendor or OEM, the answers apply only to the context in which the chip is used. For example, the response to C2.4 need list only the cryptographic algorithms used, not all the algorithms supported by the chip.

Where cryptography is used to meet any of the requirements, then best practice cryptography shall be used, see section 1.4.

## Immutable Platform Root of Trust

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| C1.1 | The chip shall support a hardware mechanism(s) to isolate the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) from the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how isolation is implemented, for example through TrustZone or dual cores.)* | | | |
| C1.2 | The chip shall support Secure Boot, initiated from code in the immutable Platform Root of Trust, and which ensures device security in the event of a failure.  This must apply to all the firmware and software in the SPE. It should also apply to the first NSPE image loaded.  Note that asymmetric signing is expected, however, symmetric signing can be accepted if the requirement in C1.4 is met. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe which cryptographic functions and key sizes are used for secure boot, and how the cryptography is implemented, such as use of a hardware cryptographic accelerator or software in immutable code. Also describe how the Immutable code is implemented and if in some form updateable on-chip memory (such as EEPROM or Flash) how that is locked. Describe how a Secure Boot failure is handled and how the security of the device is maintained.)* | | | |
| C1.3  (Optional) | The chip shall support a security lifecycle, i.e., protecting critical security parameters and sensitive data based on device lifecycle state and enforcing the rules for transition between states, including any factory reset. In all cases the requirements of BP5.3 must be considered.  Lifecycle states can typically be classed as follows, i) non-secure assembly and test, ii) provisioning, secured provisioned and operational, iii) decommissioned, and iv) debug, if debug of a secured provisioned device is supported.  *NB: Security lifecycle is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of PSA Certified.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe supported lifecycle states and transition rules, and for each state, which critical Security Parameters, and any other sensitive data, is protected and how it is protected.)* | | | |
| C1.4 | The chip shall support the secure storage or derivation of following minimum set, or equivalent, of critical security parameters:   * A secret Hardware Unique Key (HUK), with at least with 128-bits of entropy, used for deriving other device secrets. * A PSA-RoT Public Key, or hash of, used for authenticating the first updateable firmware component code during secure boot. If symmetric signing is unavoidable, the key must be unique per device. * An identifier or identifiers that uniquely identifies the Immutable PSA-RoT of the chip, for example, manufacturer, part number, revision number, and identifies the specific instance.   If the chip supports attestation the chip shall also support the secure storage or derivation of the following, or equivalent, critical security parameters:   * A secret attestation key. * An identifier that uniquely identifies the attestation key.   The chip may support the secure storage of additional critical security parameters and sensitive data.  All critical security parameters must be protected against unauthorized modification, and the secret parameters protected also against unauthorized reading. Protection is required against software attacks and basic physical attacks such as probing of the external interfaces of the chip.  These keys and identifiers may be injected during chip manufacture, or during the manufacture of the device by the OEM (see C1.5), or derived from the HUK. They can also be derived from a Physically Unique Function (PUF). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe key size for each key, and, if applicable, the key derivation method for the Attestation Key. If HUK is derived from a PUF, provide a rationale of key uniqueness. Describe the protection of the functions to read the keys and how the chip data are protected from modification.)* | | | |
| C1.5 Optional | The chip shall support the injection of keys and identifiers during the manufacture of the device by the OEM. A typical example is the key used for authenticating the first updateable firmware image. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the mechanisms available to an OEM to provision keys and identities and how to enforce modification and read rights (see C1.4).)* | | | |

## PSA RoT

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| C2.1 | The PSA-RoT shall support update of the PSA-RoT and any Application RoTs. Updates may be delivered either from locally connected devices (such as removable media) or from remote servers.  Updates shall be validated by the PSA-RoT to check integrity and authenticity immediately prior to execution (see C1.2) and, optionally, at the time of download. This includes the executable code and any related data, such as configuration data, and version numbering.  The cryptography used shall comply with requirement C2.4. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how updates are validated, including the cryptographic algorithms, the key size and where the keys used for validation are stored. Justification is required if local validation of update from remote servers prior to installation cannot be supported, typically due to resource constraints.)* | | | |
| C2.2 (Optional) | The PSA-RoT shall prevent unauthorized rollback of updates (see C2.1) and protect the current reference firmware version number in an anti-rollback counter, in secure storage (for example, protected flash or OTP). A mechanism may be provided to support authorized rollback for recovery reasons.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V3.1.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the versioning information used to detect rollback and how it is protected in integrity and against rollback and over or underflow. If supported, describe how authorized rollback is implemented.)* | | | |
| C2.3 | The PSA-RoT shall perform authorized access control for modification and use of PSA-RoT critical security parameters and for System Software or Device sensitive data managed by the PSA-RoT. For example, the PSA-RoT shall control access to any such data stored using the PSA Secure Storage service (or equivalent). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the System Software subjects concerned by access control and how they are identified or authenticated)* | | | |
| C2.4 | The PSA-RoT shall use best practice cryptography for protection of its assets, as recommended, for example, by national security agencies. This includes the provision of a suitable source of random data. There should be no reliance on proprietary cryptographic algorithms or customization of standard cryptographic algorithms.  This PSA Certified level requires a minimum security strength in line with the current version of NIST SP-800-57 [16] recommendations. RSA-2048 will not be accepted in products certified from 2027 onwards.  *NB: Weak cryptographic algorithms or key sizes may be available for specific uses (e.g., legacy) and with specific guidance. They shall not be used in any way that reduces the security of the best practice cryptography.*  *NB: A TRNG or a suitably seeded Deterministic Random Bit Generator can be used. The Developer should declare any conformance with random number specifications, for example NIST SP800-90B, for inclusion in the certificate.* |  |  |  |
| *(List the cryptographic algorithms provided by the PSA-RoT and the supported key sizes. Also describe how random number generation is performed.)* | | | |

# System Software Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to the software executing in the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE), see section 1.4. Skip this section if the evaluation applies to the Chip only, or if the version of the System Software on the chip referenced in Section 3.3 is already PSA-Certified. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

When this section is filled in by the System Software vendor, it is acceptable to answer “Yes” to those requirements where the vendor provides the ability for the OEM to configure the device such that the OEM can meet the requirement. This situation arises where the system OEM, and not the software vendor, is responsible for the deployed configuration. The System Software vendor should state that this is the case as the answer to the requirement.

When this section is filled in by the OEM, the provided answers apply only to the context in which the System Software is used. For instance, the OEM may only provide in S2.3 the cryptographic algorithms that are used, not all the algorithms supported by the System Software.

Where cryptography is used to meet any of the requirements, then best practice cryptography shall be used, see section 1.4.

## Code Integrity

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S1.1 | The System Software shall support update of the system software and the application specific software, either from locally connected devices (such as removable media) or from remote servers.  Updates shall be validated by the system software or the PSA-RoT to check the integrity and authenticity immediately prior to execution and, optionally, at the time of download. This includes the executable code and any related data, such configuration data and version numbering. The cryptography used shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| (*Describe how updates are validated, including the cryptographic algorithms, the key sizes and where the keys used for validation are stored. Justification is required if local validation of an update from remote servers prior to installation cannot be supported, typically due to resource constraints.)* | | | |
| S1.2 (Optional) | The System Software shall prevent unauthorized rollback of updates to system software, any applicable application software and authentication data. A mechanism may be provided to support authorized rollback for recovery reasons.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V3.1.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the versioning information used to detect rollback and how it is protected in integrity and against rollback and overflow. If supported, describe how authorized rollback is implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT for the most secure solution.)* | | | |
| S1.3 (Optional) | The System Software should perform Secure Boot for the NSPE System Software and application specific software.  Note that the first stage of the System Software should be authenticated by the PSA RoT, see C1.2 and D1.1. This requirement refers to extending the chain of trust beyond the first stage of the NSPE.  The Secure Boot process shall ensure the security of the device in the event of a failure. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe which cryptographic functions and key sizes are used for secure boot, and how the cryptography is implemented, such as use of a hardware cryptographic accelerator or use of verified software. For the latter, describe how the verification code is itself verified. Describe how a Secure Boot failure is handled and how the security of the device is maintained.)* | | | |

## Data Assets

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S2.1 | The System Software shall rely only on the PSA-RoT for all queries of the PSA-RoT (chip) identity (see C1.4).  The System Software should rely only on the PSA-RoT for all other PSA RoT stored or derived critical security parameters, see C1.4. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how the PSA-RoT identity is used in preference to other identities that may exist.)* | | | |
| S2.2 | The System Software shall use secure storage to protect sensitive data and provide this functionality for application data. It shall additionally bind the sensitive data to a specific device instance and, if supported, security lifecycle state (see C1.3 and BP5.6).  The cryptography used for secure storage shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how secure storage is implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure storage service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |
| S2.3 | The System Software shall use best practice cryptography as required by applicable standards or recommended by national security agencies, covering choice of algorithms, key lengths, random number generation, and generation of critical security parameters from low entropy sources, based on the identified threats.  There should be no reliance on proprietary cryptographic algorithms or customization of standard cryptographic algorithms.  This PSA Certified level requires a minimum security strength in line with the current version of NIST SP-800-57 [16] recommendations. RSA-2048 will not be accepted in products certified from 2027 onwards |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the cryptographic algorithms provided by the System Software, supported key sizes and how they are implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT cryptographic service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

## Communication

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S3.1 | For two-way communication protocols and for each network interface, the System Software shall provide the ability to establish a trust relationship when making a connection with any devices or servers. This is typically achieved through authentication.  This will likely be used for Device requirement D2.2. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S3.2 | The System Software shall provide the ability to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged with remote devices and servers.  This will likely be used for Device requirement D2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S3.3 | The System Software shall provide secure protocols, compliant with requirement S2.3, for authentication and encryption of two-way communication. The selected protocols shall not leak data that would lead to the identification of vulnerable devices.  This will likely be used for Device requirement D2.4.  *NB: If the System Software relies on TLS, the version shall be 1.2 or later, and it shall forbid the fallback to legacy cipher suites publicly known to be unsecure (such as 3DES, DES, IDEA, RC4, or Null).* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. List the protocols used and if they are certified.)* | | | |

## Hardening

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S4.1 (Optional) | The System Software shall support an attestation method that can be used to prove the genuineness of the device. If possible, the current security lifecycle state of the device should be included.  This should make use of a PSA RoT Initial Attestation Key (see C1.4), or equivalent, to bind any attestation report to the specific chip instance.  This will likely be used for Device requirement D3.2. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure attestation service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |
| S4.2 | Software functionality that is not needed for the intended usage of the device shall not be installed. If non-installation is not practical then techniques to prevent use should, wherever possible, be used.  Where this can only be determined by the Device manufacturer, the System Software shall provide the necessary mechanisms.  This will likely be used for Device requirement D3.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S4.3 (Optional) | The System Software should provide logging of security relevant events and errors. The log should include sufficient detail to determine what happened and should be integrity protected.  Examples of relevant security events and errors may include those related to secure boot (S1.3, C1.2), updates (S1.1, C2.1), anti-rollback (S1.2, C2.2), access violations (S4.6, C1.1), unauthorized access (S3.1, S4.4, S6.1, S7.1, C1.4, C2.3), invalid data (D3.8, S4.5).  *NB: Not all devices may support logging, due to constrained resources for instance. Logging is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of this document.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how logs are protected and how they can be retrieved if necessary)* | | | |
| S4.4 (Optional) | If the System Software supports logging, it shall restrict access to the log files to authorized users only (refer to S5.3). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S4.5 | Data input via physical or logical interfaces shall be validated defensively against malformed input.  Data output via physical or logical interfaces shall not lead to the identification of vulnerable devices or result in a device vulnerability.  Data transferred via critical system software Application Programming Interfaces (API) shall be validated defensively against malformed input and return data should not lead to a vulnerability.  *NB: System Software compliance may be limited because any data input or output that is application specific may only be practical at the Device level (see D3.8).* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.).* | | | |
| S4.6 | If supported, the System Software shall enable the execution of application specific software and system software with the lowest level of privilege necessary for the intended function.  Where supported, each authenticated user, application, process, etc., shall have limited privileges based on pre-determined and/or securely configurable access controls. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Passwords and Critical Security Parameters

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S5.1 | If the System Software has a mechanism to reset passwords and critical security parameters, they shall not be resettable to any universal factory default value. Such data must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S5.2 | If the System Software makes use of passwords they should conform with security best practices, in particular, password length and complexity, and the number of failed authentication attempts (refer for instance to NIST SP 800-63B guidelines for memorized secrets).  Where default passwords are used, they must be unique per device and must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S5.3 | If the System Software makes use of critical security parameters for user authentication, the cryptography used for that feature shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes used for user authentication)* | | | |

## Configuration

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S6.1 | If the System Software allows security-relevant configuration changes via a network or other interface, the related configuration change shall only be accepted after authentication (see S1.1, S3.1, S3.3 and S5.3).  Examples of security-relevant changes include:   * access control management for remote or local users, configuration of network keys, * passwords policy (such as changes or thresholds), update policy (such as query frequency, automatic installation, server address, rollback), * configuration of cryptography (such as default key length), access to network interfaces and authentication policy (such as account lock thresholds after failed authentication attempts). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Privacy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| S7.1 | If the System Software allows persistent storage of personal configuration data, it shall allow only the owner or an authorized entity to read and erase this data. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

# Device Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to a device built on the System Software (section 5) built on the Chip PSA-RoT (section 4). Skip this section if the scope of evaluation does not include the device. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

Where cryptography is used to meet any of the requirements, then best practice cryptography shall be used, see section 1.4.

## Code Integrity

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D1.1 | The device shall be configured to enforce Secure Boot for the PSA-RoT, any Application RoT Service(s) (see C1.2) and at least the first executable code image, but ideally all, of the NSPE system software and application specific software (see S1.3).  The Secure Boot process shall ensure the security of the device in the event of a failure. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Describe how a Secure Boot failure is handled and how the security of the device is maintained.)* | | | |
| D1.2 | The device shall ensure the authenticity and integrity, and apply any anti-rollback checks, of software updates. Delivery of software updates via network interfaces shall be in accordance with D2.2.  The device shall be configured to ensure that the PSA-RoT and any Application RoT Service(s) updates are performed (see C2.1), and that any anti-rollback checks are performed (see C2.2).  The device shall be configured to ensure that any system software update is performed, (see S1.1), and that any anti-rollback checks are performed (see S1.2).  The device shall apply application software updates and ensure that any anti-rollback checks are performed.  Push or pulled automatic update and/or update notification should be enabled by default if the deployment eco system requires it. Disabling, enabling, or postponing installation of security updates and/or update notifications shall be possible by authorized entities.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V3.1.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Communication

| **ID** | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D2.1 | The device shall close all physical and logical interfaces not necessary for the intended use of the device.  Examples include, serial and network interfaces, TCP/UDP ports or sockets relating to services not required. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.2 | For two-way communication, the device shall ensure that a trust relationship is established when making a connection with any devices or servers. This is typically achieved through authentication.  This will likely rely on System Software requirement S3.1. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.3 | The device shall ensure the confidentiality and integrity of all data exchanged with connected devices and servers.  Critical security parameters, including passwords, and any service or personally identifiable sensitive data shall always be protected in confidentiality.  This will likely rely on System Software requirement S3.2. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.4 | The device shall use secure protocols for D2.2 and D2.3.  The selected protocols shall not leak data that would lead to the identification of vulnerable devices or result in a device vulnerability.  *NB: If the device relies on TLS, the version shall be 1.2 or later, and it shall forbid the fallback to legacy cipher suite publicly known to be unsecure (such as cipher suites with 3DES, DES, IDEA, RC4, or Null).* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Hardening

| **ID** | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D3.1 | Deployed (production) devices shall be protected against unauthorized use of debug or test features, with rules depending on device lifecycle state.  Where debug is not permitted, debug symbols shall not be present in the code images on the device.  The device shall make inaccessible or erase critical security parameters, including passwords and any sensitive user assets and credentials, when debug and test features are enabled. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe which technical measures disable or deactivate debug)* | | | |
| D3.2 (Optional) | The current security lifecycle state of the device should be reportable, ideally in an attestable form, for example, using an Entity Attestation Token2.  This will likely rely on System Software requirement S4.1. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.3 | Software functionality that is not needed for the intended usage of the device shall not be installed. If non-installation is not practical then techniques to prevent use should, wherever possible, be used.  Hardware functionality, interfaces and test points that are not needed for the intended usage of the device shall be disabled. If disabling is not possible then techniques to prevent use should, wherever possible, be used.  This will likely rely on System Software requirement S4.2. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.4  (Optional) | The device should support audit logging of security relevant events and errors. The log should include enough details to determine what happened.  Examples of relevant security events and errors may include those related to secure boot (D1.1, S1.3, C1.2), updates (D1.2, S1.1, C2.1), anti-rollback (D1.2, S1.2, C2.2), access violations (D3.7, D3.9, S4.6, C1.1), unauthorized access (D3.10, S3.1, S4.4, S6.1, S7.1, C1.4, C2.3), invalid data (D3.8, S4.5).  *NB: Not all devices may support logging, for example, due to constrained resources. Logging is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of this document.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how logs are protected and how they can be retrieved if necessary)* | | | |
| D3.5 (Optional) | If the device supports audit logging, it shall restrict read access to log files to authorized users only. Write access shall be restricted to the logging service. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.6 | To ensure that the device has the necessary security properties, it and the System Software shall make use of the PSA-RoT security functionality for at least one of the PSA-RoT secure storage, cryptography, and attestation services as necessary to meet the requirements in sections 4, 5 and 6. This is in addition to secure boot (see D1.1), and updates and anti-rollback (D1.2). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how the PSA-RoT functionality is used on this device.)* | | | |
| D3.7 | The device shall be configured to ensure that all application specific software and system software executes with the lowest level of privilege necessary for the intended function.  For example, each authenticated user, application, process, etc., shall have minimal privileges based on pre-determined and/or securely configurable access controls.  This will likely rely on System Software requirement S4.6. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.8 | Data input via physical or logical interfaces shall be validated defensively against malformed input.  Data output via physical or logical interfaces shall not lead to the identification of vulnerable devices or result in a device vulnerability.  Data transferred via critical Application Programming Interfaces (API) shall be validated defensively against malformed input and return data should not lead to a vulnerability.  *NB: System Software level validation (see S4.5) may be limited because any application specific validation may only be practical at the Device level.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.9 | The device shall be configured to make use of hardware isolation mechanisms (including those configured by privileged software) to control access to memory and registers. This applies to both instruction fetches and data accesses by processors and hardware engines.  It is a mandatory requirement that the device is configured to ensure isolation of the SPE from the NSPE.  This may require support by the System Software (see S2.2, S4.6, S7.1) and Chip (see C1.1, C1.4, C2.3) |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D3.10 | The device shall ensure that any security-relevant configuration changes, including critical security parameters and passwords, via a network or other interface, shall only be accepted after authentication. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Passwords and Critical Security Parameters

| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| D4.1 | All critical security parameters, including passwords, shall be unique per device or defined by the user.  Such data shall not be resettable to any universal factory default value. Such data must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information.  *NB: It follows that such data shall not be embedded in source code.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.2 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters, including passwords, they should conform with security best practices, including, length, complexity, generation (for example, keys from passwords), and stored securely (see D4.5).  NB: see NIST SP 800-63B guidelines for memorized secrets. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.3 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters, including passwords, the device shall implement mechanisms aimed at making brute force attacks impractical.  For example, the device can apply rate limiting, or disable password entry and apply a timeout after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts before another authentication attempt is allowed. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.4 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters, including passwords, for authorization, the device shall implement mechanisms to prevent perpetual authorization.  For example, the device can implement an inactivity time-out. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.5 | The device shall use secure storage for persistent critical security parameters, including passwords, and device identity (see D4.6).  Storage of such data should use the PSA RoT. PSA-RoT storage mechanisms to bind the stored data to the specific device instance and, where supported, security lifecycle state.  NB: The PSA-RoT secure storage offers protection against software attacks and basic physical attacks such as probing of any accessible interfaces. See C1.3 and C1.4. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.6 | The device shall be uniquely identifiable.  For any machine-readable identity, secure storage provided by the PSA-RoT is required to prevent unauthorized modification or tampering, see D4.5 and C1.4.  The unique device identity must be included in anyattestation claim set, making the identity verifiable and attributable to that device instance. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.7 | The Device shall use best practice cryptography as required by applicable standards or recommended by national security agencies, covering choice of algorithms, key lengths, random number generation, and generation of critical security parameters from low entropy sources, based on the identified threats.  There should be no reliance on proprietary cryptographic algorithms or customization of standard cryptographic algorithms.  This PSA Certified level requires a minimum security strength in line with the current version of NIST SP-800-57 [16] recommendations. RSA-2048 will not be accepted in products certified from 2027 onwards. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Privacy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| D5.1 | The device must ensure that any stored personal data, including that in any log files, shall only be accessible by the owner or an authorized entity.  The device must support the erasure of any local data, including any personal information, passwords, keys, and log files, created through use by the end user, unless explicitly required to persist.  Any such erasure, including through a factory reset (see section 1.4), must be authorized, and must leave the device in a secure state. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D5.2 (optional) | The device shall use secure storage for persistent end user personal data, in accordance with D4.5. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure storage service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

# Regulations

## UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure

The PSTI Act from the UK government came into force on 29th April 2024.

The security requirements applicable to relevant connectable products[[7]](#footnote-8) are defined in Schedule 1 of [11] and relate to passwords, information on how to report security issues, and information on minimum security update periods. Under Schedule 2 of [11], compliance with ETSI EN 303 645 [2] provisions 5.1-1, 5.1-2, 5.2-1, and 5.3-13 is deemed to show compliance with the Schedule 1 requirements. The requirements are covered in the section 7.1.1. The ETSI provisions are quoted verbatim, with permission, and are © ETSI 2020 All rights reserved.

Section 7.1.2 covers the minimum information required for any statement of compliance in accordance with Schedule 4 of [11].

### Security Requirements

| Schedule 1 ID | ETSI Provision deemed to show compliance with Schedule 1 security requirement | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| 1.(2) Passwords | Provision 5.1-1: Where passwords are used and in any state other than the factory default, all consumer IoT device passwords shall be unique per device or defined by the user.  Provision 5.1-2: Where pre-installed unique per device passwords are used, these shall be generated with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against a class or type of device. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)*  D4.1, D4.2 | | | |
| 2.(2) Information on how to report security issues | Provision 5.2-1: The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available. This policy shall include, at a minimum:   * contact information for the reporting of issues; and * information on timelines for:  1. initial acknowledgement of receipt; and 2. status updates until the resolution of the reported issues. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)*  BP2.1, BP2.2, BP2.3, BP2.4, BP2.5 | | | |
| 3.(2) Information on minimum security update periods | Provision 5.3-13: The manufacturer shall publish, in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user, the defined support period. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)*  BP2.2 | | | |

### Minimum Information Required for Statement of Compliance

Schedule 4 of [11] specifies the minimum information that must be included in any statement of conformance. PSA certification is a statement of conformance to the PSA requirements, thus the following table lists the PSTI requirements and coverage by the PSA Certified process.

| Schedule 4 ID | Minimum Information Required for Statement of Conformance | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| 1.(1)(a) | product (type, batch) |  |  |  |
| Section 3.3 | | | |
| 1.(1)(b) | name and address of each manufacturer of the product and, where applicable, each authorised representative; |  |  |  |
| Section 3.1 | | | |
| 1.(1)(c) | a declaration that the statement of compliance is prepared by or on behalf of the manufacturer of the product |  |  |  |
| Section 3.6 or section 3.7 and section 3.8 | | | |
| 1.(1)(d) | a declaration that, in the opinion of the manufacturer, they have complied with either— (i) the applicable security requirements in Schedule 1; or  (ii) the deemed compliance conditions in Schedule 2; |  |  |  |
| Device level PSA Certificate awarded | | | |
| 1.(1)(e) | the defined support period for the product that was correct when the manufacturer first supplied the product; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)*  BP3.3 | | | |
| 1.(1)(f) | signature, name and function of the signatory |  |  |  |
| Section 3.8 Declaration of conformance for a Device level certificate | | | |
| 1.(1)(g) | the place and date of issue of the statement of compliance. |  |  |  |
| Section 3.8 Declaration of conformance for a Device level certificate | | | |

## EU Cyber Resilience Act

This section covers the requirements in the EU Cyber Resiliency Act (EU-CRA) published “Texts Adopted” [19] of 12th March 2024. It also includes a preliminary mapping of the PSA Certified requirements. Note that the earlier document [8], its annexes [9] and the changes in [10] are superseded by [19].

Some text in this section is reproduced without change from [19], the contents of which are licensed by the European Union under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license[[8]](#footnote-9),[[9]](#footnote-10).

It is anticipated that EU-CRA will adopt the detailed technical requirements being developed by CEN/CENELEC in the context of the Radio Equipment Directive [15], see section 7.3. The timeframe is thought to be 2025.

### Conformity Assessment Requirements

The EU adopted text [19] requires ***all*** products with digital elements[[10]](#footnote-11) to be developed in accordance with the *essential requirements* in Annex I parts I and II. The conformity assessment procedure options are summarized in this section[[11]](#footnote-12).

For many connected products, i.e. those not defined as *important* (Annex III) or *critical* (Annex IV), section 7.2 of this document uses the term *default products.* Conformity assessment for *default products* can be by *internal control*, see Annex VIII part I (based on Module A of [20]). In summary the developer of default products should:

1. Prepare technical documentation in accordance with Annex VII.
2. Provide evidence that the *essential requirements* have been met, for example, by completing sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 of this document. Provide evidence that *information and instructions to the user* is available, for example, by completing section 7.2.4 of this document. The completed sections can then be either self-assessed or can be assessed by a PSA Certified laboratory with a view to obtaining a PSA Certified certificate.
3. Provide an EU declaration of conformity.
4. Affix the CE marking to each individual product.

The Class I and Class II *important* products that are listed in section 7.2.5, such as smart locks and firewalls, need stricter conformance assessment.

Class I products may also be assessed using *internal control* where *harmonised standards, common specifications or European**cybersecurity certification scheme* are applied. Where this is not the case then conformity assessment must follow one of the following;

1. *EU-type examination* and *Internal production control* as described in Annex VIII parts II and III respectively. These are based on Module B and Module C of [20], respectively.
2. *Full quality assurance* as described in Annex VIII part IV. This is based on Module H of [20].

Class II products must always involve a third-party assessment11.

Note that the harmonized standards are yet to be developed and published.

To help companies with Class I and Class II products prepare for the CRA prior to the availability of a harmonized standard, it is proposed that the *default product* process is followed but with assessment by a PSA Certified laboratory. When the harmonized standard is published (the time frame is currently unclear) the developer of Important Class I or Class II products should switch to that document to demonstrate compliance.

### Product Cybersecurity Requirements

Annex I part 1 of [19] covers the cybersecurity requirements of the product, in other words, the device.

PSA Certified Device level questions (section 6) requirements are mapped in this section. This means that the given mappings are thought to comply with, or support meeting, the relevant requirement. The requirements will also be applicable to system software (e.g., operating systems) and the hardware (e.g., microprocessors and microcontrollers). However, the relevance in those cases may be less obvious and justification for non-compliance will be necessary.

| **Annex I part I ID** | **Cybersecurity Requirements** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| 1 | Products with digital elements shall be designed, developed and produced in such a way that they enable an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 2 | On the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment referred to in Article 13(2) and where applicable, products with digital elements shall: | | | |
| 2.(a) | be made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 2.(b) | be made available on the market with a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed between manufacturer and business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, including the possibility to reset the product to its original state. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* The following are set by default: D1.1, D2.1, D2.2, D2.3, D2.4, D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.8, D4.1, D4.2, D4.3, D4.4. Reset is covered by: D5.1 | | | |
| 2.(c) | ensure that vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates, including, where applicable, through automatic security updates that are installed within an appropriate timeframe enabled as a default setting, with a clear and easy-to-use opt-out mechanism, through the notification of available updates to users, and the option to temporarily postpone them. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.) D1.2* | | | |
| 2.(d) | ensure protection from unauthorised access by appropriate control mechanisms, including but not limited to authentication, identity or access management systems, and report on possible unauthorized access |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* The following ensure unauthorised access is denied; D1.1, D2.1, D2.2, D2.4, D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.9, D4.3, D4.6, D5.2 | | | |
| 2.(e) | protect the confidentiality of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, such as by encrypting relevant data at rest or in transit by state-of-the-art mechanism, and by using other technical means; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* The following ensure confidentiality of data: D2.2, D2.3, D2.4, D3.7, D4.5, D5.1, D5.2 | | | |
| 2.(f) | protect the integrity of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data, personal or other, commands, programs and configuration against any manipulation or modification not authorised by the user, and report on corruptions |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* 1) D1.1, D1.2, D2.1, D2.2, D2.4, D3.1, D3.3, D3.10, D4.5 2) Report on corruptions: D3.4, D3.5, D3.7, D4.5, D5.1, D5.2 | | | |
| 2.g | process only data, personal or other, that are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the intended purpose of the product with digital elements (minimisation of data) |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D3.3, D3.7, D3.8 | | | |
| 2.(h) | protect the availability of essential and basic functions, also after an incident, including through resilience and mitigation measures against denial of service attacks |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D2.1, D2.2, D2.4, D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.8, D3.10 | | | |
| 2.(i) | minimise the negative impact by the products themselves or connected devices on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D2.2, D2.4, D3.3 | | | |
| 2.(j) | be designed, developed and produced to limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D1.1, D2.1, D2.2, D2.4, D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.8, D4.2 | | | |
| 2.(k) | be designed, developed and produced to reduce the impact of an incident using appropriate exploitation mitigation mechanisms and techniques |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D1.2, D3.7, D3.8, D3.9, D4.1, D4.3, D4.2, D4.4, D4.5 | | | |
| 3.(l) | provide security related information by recording and monitoring relevant internal activity, including the access to or modification of data, services or functions, with an opt-out mechanism for the user |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* D3.4, D3.5 | | | |
| 2.(m) | provide the possibility for users to securely and easily remove on a permanent basis all data and settings and, where such data can be transferred to other products or systems, ensure this is done in a secure manner. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

### Vulnerability Handling Requirements

Annex I part II of [19] is concerned with the vulnerability handling responsibilities of the device vendor.

| Annex I Part II ID | Manufacturers of products with digital elements shall: | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| 1 | identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies of the product |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 2 | in relation to the risks posed to the products with digital elements, address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay, including by providing security updates; where technically feasible, new security updates shall be provided separately from functional updates. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 3 | apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 4 | once a security update has been made available, share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities, including a description of the vulnerabilities, information allowing users to identify the product with digital elements affected, the impacts of the vulnerabilities, their severity and clear and accessible information helping users to remediate the vulnerabilities; in duly justified cases, where manufacturers consider the security risks of publication to outweigh the security benefits, they may delay making public information regarding a fixed vulnerability until after users have been given the possibility to apply the relevant patch |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 5 | put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 6 | take measures to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities in their product with digital elements as well as in third party components contained in that product, including by providing a contact address for the reporting of the vulnerabilities discovered in the product with digital elements. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 7 | provide for mechanisms to securely distribute updates for products with digital elements to ensure that vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated in a timely manner and, where applicable for security updates, in an automatic manner |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 8 | ensure that, where security updates are available to address identified security issues, they are disseminated without delay and, unless otherwise agreed between a manufacturer and a business user in relation to a tailor- made product with digital elements, free of charge, accompanied by advisory messages providing users with the relevant information, including on potential action to be taken. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

### Information and Instructions to the User

Information and instructions to the user are required as part of the technical document deliveries required by Annex VII, see clause 1.(d) of [19]. The requirements in the following table come from Annex II of [19].

| Annex II  ID | At a minimum, the product with digital elements shall be accompanied by; | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| 1 | the name, registered trade name or registered trademark of the manufacturer, and the postal address, the email address or other digital contact as well as, where available, the website at which the manufacturer can be contacted; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 2 | the single point of contact where information about vulnerabilities of the product with digital elements can be reported and received, and where the manufacturer’s policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure can be found. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 3 | name and type and any additional information enabling the unique identification of the product with digital elements |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 4 | the intended purpose of the product with digital elements, including the security environment provided by the manufacturer, as well as the product’s essential functionalities and information about the security properties |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 5 | any known or foreseeable circumstance, related to the use of the product with digital elements in accordance with its intended purpose or under conditions of reasonably foreseeable misuse, which may lead to significant cybersecurity risks |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 6 | where applicable, the internet address at which the EU declaration of conformity can be accessed |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 7 | the type of technical security support offered by the manufacturer and the end-date of the support period during which users can expect vulnerabilities to be handled and to receive security updates |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 8 | detailed instructions or an internet address referring to such detailed instructions and information on:   1. the necessary measures during initial commissioning and throughout the lifetime of the product with digital elements to ensure its secure use; 2. how changes to the product with digital elements can affect the security of data; 3. how security-relevant updates can be installed; 4. the secure decommissioning of the product with digital elements, including information on how user data can be securely removed. 5. how the default setting enabling the automatic installation of security updates, as required by Annex III, Part I point (c), can be turned off. 6. where the product with digital elements is intended for integration into other products with digital elements, the information necessary for the integrator to comply with the essential requirements set out in Annex I and the documentation requirements set out in Annex VII |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| 9 | if the manufacturer decides to make available the software bill of materials to the user, information on where the software bill of materials can be accessed |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

### Important and Critical Products with Digital Elements

The following tables list *important* and *critical* products defined in Annex III and Annex IV of [19]. Such products require a “specific conformity assessment”; see Article 32, which references Annex VIII, of [19].

| **Class I Important Products with Digital Elements** | |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | Identity management systems and privileged access management software and hardware, including authentication and access control readers, including biometric readers |
| 2 | Standalone and embedded browsers |
| 3 | Password managers |
| 4 | Software that searches for, removes, or quarantines malicious software |
| 5 | Products with digital elements with the function of virtual private network (VPN) |
| 6 | Network management systems |
| 7 | Security information and event management (SIEM) systems |
| 8 | Boot Managers |
| 9 | Public key infrastructure and digital certificate issuance software |
| 9[[12]](#footnote-13) | Physical and virtual network interfaces |
| 10 | Operating systems |
| 11 | Routers, modems intended for the connection to the internet, and switches |
| 12 | Microprocessors with security-related functionalities |
| 13 | Microcontrollers with security-related functionalities |
| 14 | Application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) with security-related functionalities |
| 15 | Smart home general purpose virtual assistants |
| 16 | Smart home products with security functionalities, including smart door locks, security cameras, baby monitoring systems and alarm systems |
| 17 | Internet connected toys covered by Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council[[13]](#footnote-14) that have social interactive features (e.g. speaking or filming) or that have location tracking features |
| 18 | Personal wearable products to be worn or placed on a human body that have a health monitoring (such as tracking) purpose and to which Regulation (EU) 2017/745 or Regulation (EU) 2017/746 do not apply, or personal wearable products that are intended for the use by and for children |

| **Class II Important Products with Digital Elements** | |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | Hypervisors and container runtime systems that support virtualised execution of operating systems and similar environments |
| 2 | Firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems |
| 3 | Tamper-resistant microprocessors |
| 4 | Tamper-resistant microcontrollers |

Annex IV of [19] covers the *critical products with digital elements* products in the following table. Clauses (46) and (47) in [19] state the intent for *mandatory European cybersecurity certification* to an assurance level *at least ‘substantial’*.

| **Critical Products with Digital Elements** | |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | Hardware Devices with Security Boxes; |
| 2 | Smart meter gateways within smart metering systems as defined in Article 2(23) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 and other devices for advanced security purposes, including for secure cryptoprocessing; |
| 3 | Smartcards or similar devices, including secure elements. |

## Radio Equipment Directive Cyber-security Requirements

The EU provided the Standardisation request M/585[[14]](#footnote-15) for the Radio Equipment Directive (RED) that provides specific technical requirements related to Article 3(3), points (d), (e) and (f) in Annex 2 Part B of [15].  These requirements are used verbatim in section 7.3.1 so a developer can show how they meet them. The standardization request was adopted on 23rd August 2023 and expires on 31st December 2025.

Article 3(3), points (d), (e) and (f), of Directive 2014/53/EU [12] aims at ensuring that the concerned radio equipment protect the user from cyber security risks. Amendments to [12] are covered in [13], but with no apparent change in this area.

Clause 1.1 (a) of Part A of ANNEX II of [15] concerns the “detailed technical specifications”. These are given in clause 2 of Part B of ANNEX II and used verbatim in section 7.3.1. Note that there is overlap in some of the specific requirements in ANNEX II part B clauses 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, which relate to 3(3) points (d), (e) and (f) respectively of the RED. Note also that the table excludes text from [15] in the identified clauses that concern generation of the specifications.

CEN/CENELEC have been tasked with the creation of harmonised standards, see section 7.3.2; these will not be mandatory to show compliance with the RED. However, a vendor who does not follow the harmonized standards will be required to go through a certification scheme approved by a Notified Body.

Clause 1.1 (b) of Part A of ANNEX II of [15] concerns the “test methods or equivalent approaches and conditions to verify compliance of the radio equipment with the corresponding specifications". Article 17 of [12] covers the conformity assessment procedures.

### Security Requirements

| Scope | ANNEX II Part B Clause | Objective | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| Authentication and access control | 2.1 (c) 2.2 (b) 2.3 (b) | implement appropriate authentication and access control mechanisms; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Attack Surfaces | 2.1 (f) 2.2 (h) 2.3 (f) | protect the exposed attack surfaces and minimise the impact of successful attacks. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Network Monitoring | 2.1 (a) | include elements to monitor and control network traffic, including the transmission of outgoing data; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| DoS | 2.1 (b) | are designed to mitigate the effects of ongoing denial of service attacks; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Vulnerabilities at deployment | 2.1 (d) | are provided, on a risk basis, with up-to-date software and hardware at the moment of placing on the market that do not contain publicly known exploitable vulnerabilities as regards harm to the network or its functioning or misuse of network resources; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.2 (c) | are provided, on a risk basis, with up-to-date software and hardware at the moment of placing on the market that do not contain publicly known exploitable vulnerabilities as regards data protection and privacy; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.3 (c) | are provided, on a risk basis, with up-to-date software and hardware at the moment of placing on the market that do not contain publicly known exploitable vulnerabilities as regards financial or monetary data; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Updates | 2.1 (e) | are provided with automated and secure mechanisms for updating software or firmware that allow, when necessary, the mitigation of vulnerabilities that if exploited may lead to the radio equipment harming the network or its functioning or the misuse of network resources; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.2 (d) | are provided with automated and secure mechanisms for updating software or firmware that allow, when necessary, the mitigation of vulnerabilities that if exploited may lead to unauthorised processing, including storage, access, disclosure, destruction, loss or alteration or lack of availability of personal data; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.3 (d) | are provided with automated and secure mechanisms for updating software or firmware that allow, when necessary, the mitigation of vulnerabilities that if exploited may lead to unauthorised processing, including storage, access, disclosure, destruction, loss or alteration or lack of availability of financial or monetary data; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Protection of data | 2.2 (a) | protect stored, transmitted or otherwise processed personal data against accidental or unauthorised processing, including storage, access, disclosure, destruction, loss or alteration or lack of availability; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.3 (a) | protect stored, transmitted or otherwise processed financial or monetary data against accidental or unauthorised processing, including storage, access, disclosure, destruction, loss or alteration or lack of availability; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Notification of changes | 2.2 (e) | include functionalities to inform the user of changes that may affect data protection and privacy; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Logging | 2.2 (f) | log the internal activity that can have an impact on data protection or privacy; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| 2.3 (e) | log the internal activity that can have an impact on financial or monetary data |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |
| Deletion of personal data | 2.2 (g) | allow users to easily delete their stored personal data, enabling the disposal or replacement of equipment without the risk of exposing personal data; |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met and provide links to supporting evidence.)* | | | |

### CEN/CENELEC Harmonised Standards

JTC13 working group 8 is generating three harmonised cyber-security requirement standards [13] (see also ANNEX I of [14]), to cover the requirements in section 7.3.1 (from [15] Annex II part B) .

1. prEN18031-1 covers the common security requirements for internet connected radio equipment. This relates to Article 3(3) point (d) of [12].
2. prEN18031-2 covers the common security requirements for radio equipment processing data focusing on childcare, toys, and wearables. This relates to Article 3(3) point (e) of [12].
3. prEN18031-3 covers the common security requirement for radio equipment focusing on processing virtual money or items of a monetary value. This relates to Article 3(3) point (f) of [12].

It is anticipated that the listed requirements specifications will be adopted by the EU-CRA and compliance with the RED will be applicable only to the non-cybersecurity parts.

1. Best Practices

In addition to the technical security measures that are in the scope of Level 1 PSA certification covered in the requirements expressed in sections 4, 5 and 6, this appendix lists many organizational, development and other best practices that contribute to comprehensive device security. These are collated from references ETSI 303 645 [2], NIST8259A [3], SB-327 [4], UK DSIT [5], and Matter [6], and ioXt [7].

The best practices given in Appendix A.1 reflect common requirements that appear in many standards and are, or are likely to become, legal requirements in many territories. Verification of compliance to these organizational best practices by the Evaluation Laboratory during a PSA certification Level 1 evaluation is optional but recommended.

Appendices A.2 onwards categorize the best practices. Other than those in Appendix A.1, assessment is not performed by the Evaluation Laboratory during a PSA certification Level 1 evaluation.

* 1. Assessable Best Practices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ID | Requirement | Supported? | | |
| Yes | Partial | N/A |
| BP2.2 (Optional) | The Developer should provide a public point of contact as part of its vulnerability disclosure policy, enabling externally identified vulnerabilities to be reported. |  |  |  |
| *(Optional notes)* | | | |
| BP3.3 (Optional) | The Developer should explicitly state the minimum length of time for which the device will receive security updates or provide an expiration date after which security updates will not be issued. |  |  |  |
| *(Optional notes)* | | | |

* 1. Device Identification

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP1.1 | The device model designation should be easily visible to the end-user. |
| BP1.2 | The device identification number should be easily visible to the end-user. |

* 1. Vulnerability Disclosure

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP2.1 | The Developer should publish their vulnerability disclosure policy and response plan, which should be easily accessible from its website. |
| BP2.2 | The Developer should provide its public point of contact as part of its vulnerability disclosure policy, enabling externally identified vulnerabilities to be reported. See Appendix A.1. |
| BP2.3 | The Developer should act in a timely manner after discovery of a vulnerability, provide security updates and make them available to affected devices. |
| BP2.4 | The Developer should actively monitor for vulnerabilities likely to affect the security of its device and have a defined maintenance plan. |
| BP2.5 | The Developer should notify the end-user of known vulnerabilities, update availability and other possible mitigations. |

* 1. Update

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP3.1 | The device should install by default available updates. |
| BP3.2 | The device should check after initialization for available updates. |
| BP3.3 | The Developer should explicitly state the minimum length of time for which the device will receive security updates or provide an expiration date after which security updates will not be issued. See Appendix A.1. |

* 1. Critical Security Parameters

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP4.1 | The Developer should ensure uniqueness for pre-installed Critical Security Parameters. |
| BP4.2 | The Developer should ensure that pre-installed Critical Security Parameters are generated with sufficient entropy. |
| BP4.3 | The Developer should follow a secure management process for the protection of Critical Security Parameters stored outside the device. |
| BP4.4 | The Developer should follow a secure management process for the generation and issuance of Critical Security Parameters. |

* 1. Installation, Commissioning and Reset

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP5.1 | The Developer should design device installation and maintenance processes to employ minimal steps while ensuring security. |
| BP5.2 | The Developer should provide clear guidance to the end-user for device installation and maintenance. |
| BP5.3 | If the device requires any user installation or commissioning operation then that mode should automatically end if not completed within a specific time, or after a specific number of failed attempts. |
| BP5.4 | Information required for a user to install or commission a device should be hidden or removable from the device, or if performed electronically, for example over a wireless link, then that link must be protected in accordance with D2.4, to prevent an attacker performing an installation. |
| BP5.5 | Initiation of user installation or commissioning should require physical proximity and action by the user, such as pressing a button, that cannot be achieved remotely. |
| BP5.6 | Where a factory reset is supported, all local data, including any keys and personal data, created through use by the end user must be erased, unless explicitly required to persist. |

* 1. Privacy

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | Best practice |
|
| BP6.1 | The Developer should inform the end-user when personal data is processed, by who and for which purpose, and obtain clear consent. |
| BP6.2 | The Developer should allow the end-user to withdraw at any time its content for processing of its personal data |
| BP6.3 | The Developer should provide clear instructions to the end-user on how to delete their personal data. |
| BP6.4 | The Developer should minimize and anonymize whenever possible the data collected from end-user logs. |

* 1. Development

| ID | Best practice |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP7.1 | The Developer should make use of development tools, for example, static code analysis, as part of a Security Design Lifecycle. |
| BP7.2 | The Developer should make use of available in-processor code hardening technologies that aim, for example, and not limited to;   * provide protection against stack smashing or overflow attacks, * enhance control flow integrity making it difficult for an attacker to mount call/jump and return orientated programming attacks, * make it difficult for an attacker to gain or escalate privilege, * guard against memory safety violations, and so on. |
| BP7.3 | The Developer should ensure that the manufacturing process correctly and completely establishes and confirms that all the required security related controls and configuration have been set and the correct Critical Security Parameters have been used. |

* 1. Hardening

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | Best practice |
|
| BP8.1 | Battery powered devices should minimize the impact on battery life through excessive queries by rate limiting, possibly limiting the rate to zero, for periods of time. |

1. Mapping to other Standards

The internet connected device and IoT domains are subject to several initiatives to improve device cybersecurity, from industry guidance to national regulation. While the scope of these initiatives is different from the one targeted for PSA Certified Level 1, this appendix aims at building a bridge between them. More precisely, for initiatives deemed relevant for PSA Certified Level 1, this appendix provides a mapping between other standards requirements and corresponding PSA Certified Level 1 requirements.

* 1. ETSI EN 303 645

The following table only considers the mandatory requirements from ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 standard, as per Table B.1 of [2], that have to be enforced by the device. Requirements that have be enforced by the environment of the device are not in the scope of PSA Certified Level 1.

| ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provisions | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| --- | --- |
| 5.1-1: Unique per device passwords | D4.1: Critical Security Parameters |
| 5.1.2: Automated password attacks | D4.2: Automated password attacks |
| 5.1-3: Cryptography for user authentication | S5.3: User authentication |
| 5.1-4: Change of authentication value | S6.1: Security configuration |
| 5.1-5: Authentication mechanism attack resilience | D4.2: Password best practices D4.3: Password threshold |
| 5.3-2: Mechanisms for secure updates | S1.1: Firmware update S1.2: Anti-rollback |
| 5.3-7: Best practice cryptography for updates | S1.1: Firmware update |
| 5.3-10: Trust relationship for updates | S1.1: Firmware update  D2.2: Client-Server Authentication |
| 5.4-1: Sensitive parameter secure storage | S2.2: Secure storage |
| 5.4-2: Secure storage of ID | C1.4: ID storage  D4.6: Storage |
| 5.4-3: Configurable security parameters | D4.1: Critical security parameter |
| 5.4-4: CSP unique per device resistant to automated attack | S5.1: CSP unique per device resistant to automated attack |
| 5.5-1: Secure communication | S3.3: TLS |
| 5.5-5: Authenticating parameter configuration | S6.1: Configuration  D3.10: Configuration |
| 5.5-7: Sensitive data encryption over network | D2.3: Communication encryption |
| 5.6-1: Disable unused ports | D2.1: No unused port |
| 5.6-2: Minimize unauthorized disclosure | S3.3: Secure protocols that do not leak |
| 5.6-4: Software disable of debug interface | S4.2: Unneeded functionalities |
| 5.11-1: User data erasure | S7.1: Erase user data |
| 5.13-1: Input validation | S4.5: Data validation  D3.8: Data validation |

* 1. NISTIR 8259A

The following table considers the NIST cybersecurity baseline [3].

| NISTIR 8259A Capabilities | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| --- | --- |
| Device identification | C1.4 ID storage  S2.1 Device ID  D4.6 Identification |
| Device configuration | C2.3 Access control PSA-RoT  S6.1 Configuration  D3.10 Configuration |
| Data protection | C1.1 Isolation C1.3 Protecting critical security parameters C1.4 Secure storage C2.3 Authorised access to sensitive data C2.4 Cryptography  S2.2 Secure storage S2.3 Cryptography S3.2 Secure communication S6.1 Configuration S7.1 Erase user data  D2.3 Secure Communication D4.5 Secure Storage D5.1 Data erasure D5.2 Personal data |
| Logical access to interfaces | C2.3 Access control PSA-RoT  S3.1 Connection authentication S3.2 Communication encryption S3.3 Secure protocols S4.2 Unneeded functionalities S4.5 Input validation S4.6 Privilege and access control S6.1 Configuration  D2.1 No unused port D2.2 Communication authentication D2.3 Communication encryption D2.4 Secure protocols D3.1 Debug ports D3.3 Unneeded functionalities D3.7 Privilege and access control D3.9 Isolation mechanisms |
| Software and firmware update | C2.1 Firmware update C2.2 Rollback  S1.1 System software update S1.2 Rollback S6.1 Configuration  D1.2 Rollback |
| Cybersecurity state awareness | C1.3 Security lifecycle  S4.1 Attestation S4.3 Log S4.4 Log protection  D1.1 Secure boot D3.2 Security lifecycle D3.4 Log D3.5 Log protection D5.1 Access control |

* 1. NISTIR 8425 and the US Cyber Trust Mark

NISTIR 8425 [17] was motivated by the May 12th, 2021, US Presidential Executive Order EO14028 on *Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity* and which tasked NIST with recommending a cybersecurity labelling scheme for the consumer, i.e., for home or personal use in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) space. NIST IR 8425 is built on NISTIR 8259, the technical requirements of which are in NISTIR 8259A [3] and mapped in Appendix B.2. The requirements related to the developer organization, sometimes referred to as non-technical requirements, are in NISTIR 8259B.

NISTIR 8425 focuses on an IoT Product. To understand what this means it is first necessary to understand the 8425 term IoT Product Component. An example of an IoT Product Component is an IoT Device. An IoT Device (the scope of NISTIR 8259A) is defined as having “*… at least one transducer (sensor or actuator) for interacting directly with the physical world and at least one network interface … for interfacing with the digital world.*”. However, NISTIR 8425 also considers any applications hosted on a mobile or a tablet, or a service in the cloud that interoperate with the IoT Devices to be IoT Product Components. An IoT Product Component does not refer to the physical hardware (e.g. the chip) or the software (e.g. system software) used by the manufacturer.

Therefore, an IoT Product is a user determined set of interoperable IoT Product Components, that is, the user specific collection of IoT Devices, applications, and cloud services. Applications and cloud service IoT Product Components do not meet the definition of an IoT Device and are not in the scope of this section.

The following table lists the capabilities required for an IoT Device to be compliant with NISTIR 8425 non-organizational requirements. In many cases the requirement can apply directly to the IoT Device and map to the listed PSA L1 requirements (in many cases these also align with NISTIR 8529A. However, some requirements concern the IoT Product, thus it is necessary to add specific questions.

| NISTIR 8425 Capabilities | | | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Asset Identification | 1 | The IoT product can be uniquely identified by the customer and other authorized entities (e.g., the IoT product developer). | C1.4  S2.1  D4.6 |
| 2 | The IoT product uniquely identifies each IoT product component and maintains an up-to-date inventory of connected product components. | See additional question |
| Product Configuration | 1 | Authorized individuals (i.e., customer), services, and other IoT product components can change the configuration settings of the IoT product via one or more IoT product components. | C2.3  S6.1  D3.10 |
| 2 | Authorized individuals (i.e., customer), services, and other IoT product components have the ability to restore the IoT product to a secure default (i.e., uninitialized) configuration. | S1.1, S5.1  D4.1, D5.1 |
| 3 | The IoT product applies configuration settings to applicable IoT components | D5.1  see additional question |
| Data Protection | 1 | Each IoT product component protects data it stores via secure means. | C1.4, C2.3,  S2.1, S2.2  D3.6, D4.5, D5.2 |
| 2 | The IoT product has the ability to delete or render inaccessible stored data that are either collected from or about the customer, home, family, etc. | S7.1  D5.1  See additional question |
| 3 | When data are sent between IoT product components or outside the product, protections are used for the data transmission. | S3.1  D2.2, D2.3, D2,4,  D3.6, D4.7 |
| Interface Access Control | 1.a | Use and have access only to interfaces necessary for the IoT product’s operation. All other channels and access to channels are removed or secured. | C2.3  D2.1, D3.1, D3.3 |
| 1.b | For all interfaces necessary for the IoT product’s use, access control measures are in place (e.g., unique password-based multifactor authentication, physical interface ports inaccessible from the outside of a component). | S3.1  D2.2, D3.1 |
| 1.c | For all interfaces, access and modification privileges are limited. | S3.1  D3.10 |
| 2.a | Validate that data shared among IoT product components match specified definitions of format and content. | S4.5  D3.8 |
| 2.b | Prevent unauthorized transmissions or access to other product components | S3.1, S3.2, S3.3  D2.1, D2.2, D2.3 |
| 2.c | Maintain appropriate access control during initial connection (i.e., on-boarding) and when reestablishing connectivity after disconnection or outage. | D2.2 |
| Software Updates | 1 | Each IoT product component can receive, verify, and apply verified software updates. | C2.1  S1.1  D1.2 |
| 2 | The IoT product implements measures to keep software on IoT product components up to date (i.e., automatic application of updates or consistent customer notification of available updates via the IoT product). | D1.2 |
| Cybersecurity State Awareness | 1 | The IoT product securely captures and records information about the state of IoT components that can be used to detect cybersecurity incidents affecting or affected by IoT product components and the data they store and transmit. | C1.3  S4.1  D3.2 |

The following table contains the additional requirements that reflect the placement of the IoT Device within the context of a notional IoT Product.

| NISTIR 8425 Capability Additional Question | | Supported? | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Yes | Partial | N/A |
| Asset Identification | The IoT product uniquely identifies each IoT product component and maintains an up-to-date inventory of connected product components. |  |  |  |
|  | *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| Product Configuration | The IoT product applies configuration settings to applicable IoT components |  |  |  |
|  | *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| Data Protection | The IoT product has the ability to delete or render inaccessible stored data that are either collected from or about the customer, home, family, etc. |  |  |  |
|  | *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

NISTIR 8425 forms the basis of the Federal Communications Commission work on the US Cyber Trust Mark [18] for IoT products. However, it currently restricts the scope of IoT devices to those that are internet connected and intentionally emit RF energy whether by radiation or induction. This change seems not to change the cyber security requirements. In other words, the intentional emission of RF energy is not in scope.

* 1. SB-327

The following table considers the requirements of California law [4] on cybersecurity of IoT devices.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| SB-327, SECTION 1, Title 1.81.26, 1798.91.04. | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| (a)(1) Appropriate to the nature and function of the device. | PSA Certified requirements are targeted to IoT devices. |
| (a)(2) Appropriate to the information it may collect, contain, or transmit. | PSA Certified requirements on Code Integrity, Data Assets, Communication. |
| (a)(3) Designed to protect the device and any information contained therein from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. | PSA Certified requirements on Code Integrity, Data Assets, Communication, Passwords, Hardening, Privacy. |
| (b)(1) or (b)(2) | D4.1 No default password |

* 1. Matter

This appendix gives preliminary mappings to Matter [6] Security Requirements and Security Best Practice.

| Matter Security Requirements | | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Commissioning | 13.3 a | BP5.3 |
| 13.3 b | D4.2 |
| 13.3 c | BP5.3 |
| 13.3 d | C1.4, C1.5, S4.1, D4.1 |
| 13.3 e | BP5.4 |
| 13.3 f | BP5.4 |
| 13.3 g | S6.1, D3.10 |
| Factory Reset | 13.4 a | BP5.6 |
| 13.4 b | C1.3, S2.2, D5.1, BP5.6 |
| Firmware | 13.5 a | D1.2 |
| 13.5 b | D1.2 |
| 13.5 c | S4.5 |

| Matter Security Best Practices | | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Crypto | 13.6.1 a | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 b | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 c | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 d | C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 e | D2.4 |
| Commissioning | 13.6.2 a | BP4.4 |
| 13.6.2 b | BP5.4 |
| 13.6.2 c | BP5.5 |
| 13.6.2 d | BP5.4 |
| 13.6.2 e | BP4.4 |
| 13.6.2 f | None |
| 13.6.2 g | Not applicable |
| Firmware | 13.6.3 a | BP2.2 |
| 13.6.3 b | D1.1 |
| 13.6.3 c | BP4.4 |
| Manufacturing | 13.6.4 a | D1.1, D1.2, D2.1, D3.1, D3.3, BP7.3 |
| Resiliency | 13.6.5 a | C1.2, D1.1, D3.4 |
| Battery Powered Devices | 13.6.6 a | BP8.1 |
| Tamper Resistance | 13.6.7 a | Influence which PSA Cert Level |
| Bridging | 13.6.8 | Not applicable |
| Distributed Compliance Register | 13.6.9 | Not applicable |

* 1. ioXt

This appendix has not been updated in this version.

This appendix gives preliminary mappings to the ioXt Baseline Profile certifiable requirements [7].

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ioXt Baseline Profile certifiable requirement | | PSA Level 1 Requirements |
| No Universal Passwords | UP1 | S5.1, S5.2 |
| Secured Interfaces | SI1.1 | S3.3 |
| SI1.2 | S4.2, D2.1, D3.1, D3.3 |
| SI1.3 | S3.1, D2.2, D2.4 |
| SI1.4 | S3.2, S3.3, D2.2, D2.3, D2.4 |
| Proven Crypto | PC1 | C2.4, S2.3, S5.3 |
| Verified Software | VS1 | BP2.3 |
| VS2 | C1.2 S1.1, D1.1, D1.2 |
| VS3 | C2.4 |
| Automatic Software Updates | AA1 | C2.1, S1.1 |
| AA2 | BP2.4 |
| AA3 | BP2.3 |
| Vulnerability Reporting | VDP1 | BP2.1 |
| VDP2 | BP2.2 |
| Security Expiration Data | SE1.1 | BP3.3 |
| SE1.2 | BP3.2 |

1. Changes from V3.0 BETA 01

This appendix lists the impact of changes between this revision and the V3.0 BETA 01. Items marked “Unchanged” may include those with minor typographic corrections. Those marked “Clarification” aim to clarify the requirement through re-phrasing or the addition of supplementary information, but with no intended change to the requirement. Those marked “New” have been added in this version. Those marked “Extended” means that requirement has new elements that may be applicable.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| L1 V3.0 ALPHA | Changes from v3.0 BETA 01 | |
| C1.1 | Unchanged |  |
| C1.2 | Unchanged |  |
| C1.3 | Unchanged |  |
| C1.4 | Unchanged |  |
| C1.5 | Unchanged |  |
| C2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| C2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| C2.3 | Unchanged |  |
| C2.4 | Unchanged |  |

| L1 V3.0 ALPHA | Changes from v2.2 REL 1 | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| S1.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S1.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S1.3 |  | Clarification |
| S2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S2.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S3.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S3.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S3.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.4 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.5 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.6 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S6.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S7.1 | Unchanged |  |

| L1 V3.0 ALPHA | Changes from v2.2 REL 1 | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| D1.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D1.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.3 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.3 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.5 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.6 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.7 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.8 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.9 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.10 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.3 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.5 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.6 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.7 | Unchanged |  |
| D5.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D5.2 | Unchanged |  |

| L1 V3.1 BETA | Changes from v3.0 BETA 01 | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| BP1.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP1.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.4 | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.5 | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.4 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.4 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.5 | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.6 | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.4 | Unchanged |  |
| BP7.1 | Unchanged |  |
| BP7.2 | Unchanged |  |
| BP7.3 | Unchanged |  |
| BP8.1 | Unchanged |  |

1. Marking Sheet

This appendix summarizes the expected answers for each requirement in the Chip (section 4), System Software (section 5) and Device (section 6) questionnaires for compliance to PSA Certified Level 1 and for additional compliance to the other standards considered in the document.

* 1. Chip Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally, one mandatory question answered that is not in conformance with “Expected answer” may be accepted if there is a rationale of why security is unaffected.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| C1.1 Hardware isolation of SPE | Only “Yes” |
| C1.2 Secure Boot | “Yes” |
| C1.3 (Optional) Security lifecycle support | Any Answer |
| C1.4 Secure storage of keys | “Yes” |
| C1.5 (Optional) Key Injection | Any Answer |
| C2.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| C2.2 (Optional) Rollback protection | Any Answer |
| C2.3 Access control for modifications to PSA-RoT | “Yes” |
| C2.4 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| C1.4 ID Storage | “Yes” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| --- | --- |
| C1.1 Hardware isolation of SPE | “Yes” |
| C1.3 Security lifecycle | “Yes” |
| C1.4 ID Storage | “Yes” |
| C2.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| C2.2 Rollback protection | “Yes” |
| C2.3 Access control for modifications to PSA-RoT | “Yes” |
| C2.4 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |

* 1. System Software Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally, one mandatory question answered that is not in conformance with “Expected answer” may be accepted if there is a rationale of why security is unaffected.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| S1.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 (Optional) Prevent rollback | Any Answer |
| S1.3 (Optional) Secure Boot of NSPE first stage | Any Answer |
| S2.1 Use PSA-RoT for ID queries | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Use secure storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best practice crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.1 Authenticate remote servers | “Yes” |
| S3.2 Ability to encrypt data exchanged | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g., TLS >= v1.2 | “Yes” |
| S4.1 (Optional) Attestation method of lifecycle state | Any Answer |
| S4.2 Disable/not install unused functionality | “Yes” |
| S4.3 (Optional) System Software should log security events | Any Answer |
| S4.4 (Optional) If logging enabled, restrict access of log files to auth users only | Any Answer |
| S4.5 Input protected against malformed input | “Yes” |
| S4.6 If supported, Lowest privilege necessary | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.1 If using critical security parameters, they are unique per device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 If using passwords then best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.3 If using user auth then crypto is best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 If security config changeable – auth first | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 If personal data stored it should be erasable /device reset | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| --- | --- |
| S1.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 Prevent unauthorized rollback | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Secure Storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g., TLS >= v1.2 | “Yes” |
| S4.2 Functionality not needed is not installed | “Yes” |
| S4.5 Input validation | “Yes” |
| S5.1 CSP Unique per Device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 If Passwords, then best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 Passwords best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.3 User Auth | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 Configuration | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 Erase user data | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| S1.1 System software update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 Prevent rollback | “Yes” |
| S2.1 Use PSA-RoT for ID queries | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Use secure storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best practice crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.1 Authenticate remote servers | “Yes” |
| S3.2 Ability to encrypt data exchanged | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g., TLS v1.2 or later | “Yes” |
| S4.1 Attestation token of lifecycle state | “Yes” |
| S4.2 Disable/not install unused functionality | “Yes” |
| S4.3 System Software should log security events | “Yes” |
| S4.4 Restrict access of log files to auth users only | “Yes” |
| S4.5 Input protected against malformed input | “Yes” |
| S4.6 Privilege access control | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 Passwords best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 Security config changeable – auth first | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 Personal data erasable /device reset | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* 1. Device Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally, one mandatory question answered that is not in conformance with “Expected answer” may be accepted if there is a rationale of why security is unaffected.

| PSA Certified Level 1 | Expected answer |
| --- | --- |
| D1.1 Secure boot with validated software | “Yes” |
| D1.2 PSA-RoT is updateable | “Yes” |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D2.4 The device shall use secure protocols for authentication and encryption of two-way communication | “Yes” |
| D3.1 Protect against unauthorized use of debug | “Yes” |
| D3.2 (Optional) Security lifecycle attestable | Any Answer |
| D3.3 Functionalities not needed disabled or not installed | “Yes” |
| D3.4 (Optional) Log security events | Any Answer |
| D3.5 (Optional) If log, restrict log files to auth users | Any Answer |
| D3.6 Use of PSA-RoT Services | “Yes” |
| D3.7 Lowest privilege | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D3.8 Data Input | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D3.9 Hardware based isolation | “Yes” |
| D3.10 Configuration | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.1 If critical security params then unique per device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.2 If passwords, device uses password best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.3 If passwords, ability to disable passwords or apply time out after unsuccessful auth against a password | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.4 If auth, time-out against perpetual auth | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.5 If critical security params then secure storage | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| 4.6 Configuration | “Yes” |
| D5.1 Restrict access to personal data/logs to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D5.2 (Optional) Personal data stored on PSA-RoT secure storage | Any Answer |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| --- | --- |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D4.2 Device uses password best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.3 Ability to disable passwords or apply time out after unsuccessful auth against a password | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| D1.1 Secure boot with validated software | “Yes” |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D2.4 The device shall use secure protocols for authentication and encryption of two-way communication | “Yes” |
| D3.1 Protect against unauthorized use of debug | “Yes” |
| D3.2 Security lifecycle attestable | “Yes” |
| D3.3 Functionalities not needed disabled or not installed | “Yes” |
| D3.4 Log security events | “Yes” |
| D3.5 Restrict log files to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D3.7 Privilege access control | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D3.9 Isolation mechanisms | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D3.10 Configuration | “Yes” |
| D5.1 Restrict access to personal data/logs to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.6 Identification | “Yes |
| D5.2 (Optional) Personal data stored on PSA-RoT secure storage | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. SB-327 Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified L1 | Expected answer |
| D4.2 Device uses password best practice | “Yes” |

* + 1. Marking Sheet Summary

| PSA Level 1 pass? | Answer |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – System Software pass achieved? |  |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – Device pass achieved? |  |
| UK PTSI Act (section 7.1) compliant? |  |
| Draft EU-CRA (section 7.2) compliance? |  |
| Draft RED (section 7.3) compliance? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 System Software section pass achieved? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 Device pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A System Software section pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A Device section pass achieved? |  |
| SB-327 mapping pass achieved? |  |

1. Formerly the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. <https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The isolation between the Non-Secure Processing Environment and the Secure Processing Environment can be implemented using, for example, TrustZone, using dual cores, or via processor privilege levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The Updateable Platform Root of Trust may also execute any Application specific Root-of-Trust services, but these are not in the scope of a Chip certification. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. A System Software certificate is only applicable with a valid PSA Certified chip, or the chip named in the certificate. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Note that Schedule 3 of [11] covers connectable products that are not in scope of the PSTI. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/pages/legal-notice#ecl-inpage-km0gezfs> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Clause (9) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. See also clause (92) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. There are two items labelled 9 in [19]. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys (OJ L 170, 30.6.2009, p. 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/enorm/mandate/585Amd1_en> [↑](#footnote-ref-15)