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|  | PSA Certified™ Level 1 Questionnaire Version 2.2 |



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| Author | PSA JSA Members:  Applus+, S.L  Arm Limited  CAICT  ECSEC Laboratory Inc  Prove & Run S.A.S.  Riscure B.V.  SGS Brightsight B.V.  TrustCB B.V.  UL TS B.V. |  |  |
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Abstract

PSA Certified is an independent security evaluation scheme for Platform Security Architecture (PSA) based chips, system software and for connected devices, including IoT, Edge devices, industrial and automotive applications. It establishes trust through a multi-level assurance program for chips containing a security component called a Root of Trust that provides trusted functionality to the platform. The multi-level scheme has been designed to help device makers and businesses get the level of security they need for their use case.

This document covers PSA Certified™ Level 1 which builds on the PSA Security Model and its goals, generic compute-based platform threat models and industry best practice to provide a set of critical security questions for the chip vendor, the system software supplier and the device OEM. Use this form to fill in the questionnaire for your product and review it with one of the JSA member Evaluation Laboratories. Products that become PSA Certified will be showcased on www.psacertified.org website. PSA and PSA Certified are architecture neutral.

Keywords

PSA Certified Level 1, certification, chip, connected device, internet, IoT, Platform Security Architecture, questionnaire, PSA, security, system software

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110 Fulbourn Road, Cambridge, England CB1 9NJ.

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# About this document

## Current Status and Anticipated Changes

Current Status: V2.2 Release 01

## Release Information

The change history table lists the changes that have been made to this document.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Version | Confidentiality | Change |
| 18/05/2022 | 2.2 REL01 | Non-confidential | Clarifications and enhancements. Draft alignment with Matter and ioXt. |
| 30/09/2021 | 2.1 REL02 | Non-confidential | Clarification on questionnaire reuse, minor clarifications, some now optional, removal of examples, alignment with web version. |
| 22/02/2021 | 2.1 REL01 | Non-confidential | Minor refinements and clarifications based on evaluation submission feedback. |
| 21/08/2020 | 2.1 Beta | Non-confidential | Updates and alignment with ETSI 303 645 and NISTIR 8259A. Addresses devices using application type processors. Change in compositional model for devices on system software on chips. |
| 10/02/2020 | 2.0 Beta | Non-confidential | Updates and alignment with ETSI 303 645, NISTIR 8259 and SB-327 standards |
| 30/10/2019 | 1.2 | Non-confidential | Clarifications for possible evaluation scopes and alignments with PSA Certified Level 2 |
| 01/04/2019 | 1.1 | Non-confidential | Clarifications on PSA Functional API Certification and PSA Functional APIs |
| 13/02/2019 | 1.0 | Non-confidential | Public release based on BET03 version |

## References

This document refers to the following informative documents.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ref | Doc No | Author(s) | Title |
| [1] | DEN 0079 | ARM | Device Security Model |
| [2] | EN 303 645 | ETSI | Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things; V2.1.0 (2020-04) |
| [3] | NISTIR 8259A | NIST | IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline; May 2020 |
| [4] | Bill No. 327; Chapter 886. | California State Senate | Information privacy: connected devices |
| [UK DCMS] |  | UK Department for Digital, Culture & Sport | Proposals for regulating consumer smart product cyber security[[1]](#footnote-2). |
| [6] | 0.8 2202-05-01 | CSA Matter | Connected Home over IP Specification |
| [7] |  | ioXt alliance | ioXt 2021 Base Profile, version 2 |

## Terms and Abbreviations

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Term | Meaning |
| Application Root of Trust Service(s) | Application specific security service(s) that are not defined by PSA. Such services execute in the Secure Processing Environment and are required to be in Secure Partitions. |
| Application Specific Software | Software that provides the functionality required of the specific device. This software runs in the Non-Secure Processing Environment, making use of the System software, Application RoT Services and PSA-RoT Services. |
| Critical Security Parameter | Secret information, with integrity and confidentiality requirements, used to maintain device security, such as authentication data (passwords, PIN, certificates), secret cryptographic keys, etc.. In some contexts these are classed as assets. |
| Evaluation Laboratory | Laboratory or facility that performs the technical review of questionnaires submitted for Level 1 PSA certification. The list of evaluation laboratories participating to PSA Certified can be found on www.psacertified.org |
| Hardware Unique Key (HUK) | Secret and unique to the device symmetric key that must not be accessible outside the PSA Root of Trust. It is a critical security parameter. |
| Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) | The processing environment that executes the non-secure System software and Application Specific Software. PSA requires the NSPE to be isolated from the SPE. Isolation between partitions within the NSPE is not required by PSA though is encouraged where supported. |
| Partition | The logical boundary of a software entity with intended interaction only via defined interfaces, but not necessarily isolated from software in other partitions. Note that both the NSPE and SPE may host partitions. |
| PSA | Platform Security Architecture |
| PSA Certification Body | The entity that receives applications for PSA security certification, issues certificates, maintains the security certification scheme, and ensures consistency across all the evaluation laboratories. |
| PSA Functional APIs | PSA defined Application Programming Interfaces on which security services can be built. APIs defined so far include Crypto, Secure Storage and Attestation. |
| PSA Functional API Certification | Functional certification confirms that the device implements the PSA Functional APIs correctly by passing the PSA Functional certification test suites. |
| PSA Root of Trust (PSA-RoT) | The PSA defined combination of the Immutable Platform RooT of Trust and the Updateable Platform Root of Trust, and considered to be the most trusted security component on the device. See [1]. |
| Immutable Platform Root of Trust | The minimal set of hardware, firmware and data of the PSA-RoT, which is inherently trusted because it cannot be modified following manufacture. There is no software at a deeper level that can verify that it as authentic and unmodified. |
| Updateable Platform Root of Trust | The firmware, software and data of the PSA-RoT that can be securely updated following manufacture. |
| Platform Root of Trust Service(s) | PSA defined security services for use by PSA-RoT, Application RoT Service(s) and by the NSPE. Executes in the Secure Processing Environment and may use Trusted Subsystems. This includes the services offered by the PSA Functional APIs. |
| Secure Partition | A Partition in the Secure Processing Environment. |
| Secure Processing Environment Partition Management | Management of the execution of software in Secure Partitions. Typical implementations will provide scheduling and inter-partition communication mechanisms. Implementations may also enforce isolation between the managed Secure Partitions. |
| Secure Processing Environment (SPE) | The processing environment that executes the PSA-RoT, the PSA-RoT Services, and any Application RoT Service(s). |
| Secure Boot | The process of verifying and validating the integrity and authenticity of updateable firmware and software components as a pre-requisite to their execution. This must apply to all the firmware and software in the SPE. It should also apply to the first NSPE image loaded, which may extend the NSPE secure boot chain further. |
| System Software | NSPE software that may comprise an operating system or some run-time executive, together with any middleware, standard stacks and libraries, chip specific device drivers, etc., but not the application specific software. |
| Trusted subsystem | A security subsystem that the PSA-RoT relies on for protection of its critical security parameters, or that implement some of its services. |

## Feedback

The PSA JSA Members welcome feedback on its documentation.

If you have comments on the content of this documentation, send an e-mail to psacertified@arm.com. Give:

* The title (PSA Certified Level 1 Questionnaire).
* The number (JSADEN-001) and version.
* The page numbers to which your comments apply.
* The rule identifiers to which your comments apply, if applicable.
* A concise explanation of your comments.

PSA JSA Members also welcome general suggestions for additions and improvements.

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# PSA Certified Overview

## PSA Overview

PSA defines a common hardware and software security platform, providing a generic security foundation allowing secure products and features to be deployed.

The terms PSA Certified, and PSA Functional API Certification are used here with the following meanings:

*PSA Certified*

The PSA Certified scheme involves the evaluation of a device against a set of security requirements by an Evaluation Laboratory. The evaluation laboratory examines security measures to ensure that the device, including its critical security parameters, is not vulnerable to identified threats.

Example answers for the questions can be found in the web based version of this document, which can be found at [certify.psacertified.org](https://certify.psacertified.org/).

In the case of a successful evaluation a digital certificate is issued by the PSA Certification Body (or a third-party on behalf of the PSA Joint Stakeholder Members) for that device and can optionally be published on [www.psacertified.org](http://www.psacertified.org). The certificate number is a globally unique EAN-13 number that can be supplied by the Evaluation Laboratory or by the company seeking certification. PSA devices that support, for example, an IETF Entity Attestation Token[[2]](#footnote-3) can include the EAN-13 to inform relying parties that the chip, System software or device has been evaluated and is PSA Certified.

*PSA Functional API Certification*

PSA Functional API Certification means that a device has implemented the [PSA Functional APIs](https://pages.arm.com/psa-apis.html)[[3]](#footnote-4) and passed the PSA Functional API Certification test suites. The PSA Functional APIs cover three security functions: Attestation, Cryptography and Secure Storage. A step by step guide for getting a product PSA Functional API certified is available on [www.psacertified.org/resources](http://www.psacertified.org/resources).

The PSA Certified scheme recognizes that there will be different security requirements and different cost and security trade-offs for different applications and ecosystems. This is reflected in specifications by introducing a range of *assurance levels*.

PSA Certified Level 1 assurance, the target of this document, relies on questionnaires filled out by the Chip vendor, the System software vendor or the Device OEM. The questionnaires defined in this document cover the baseline security requirements to mitigate common threats and security requirements for PSA based products. The Evaluation Laboratory relies on this questionnaire to examine the device security measures.

## Scope for Security Evaluation

There are three evaluation scopes: the chip, the system software and the device. The security evaluation covers the combination of the hardware and software components. Figure 1 illustrates the typical components in the PSA architecture and the related evaluation scopes. This figure distinguishes a Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) and a Secure Processing Environment (SPE), for which the Chip level shall provide isolation[[4]](#footnote-5).



Figure 1: Logical Scope of Chip, System Software and Device Levels

The Chip security evaluation scope includes the following Secure Processing Environment PSA-RoT elements, see also [1]:

* Immutable Platform Root of Trust, for example, the Boot ROM, any root parameters, the NSPE/SPE isolation hardware, and any hardware based security lifecycle management and enforcement.
* Updateable Platform Root of Trust, for example, a main bootloader, the code that implements the SPE Partition Management function, the code that implements the PSA defined services[[5]](#footnote-6) such as attestation, secure storage, and cryptography.
* Any Trusted subsystems that the PSA-RoT relies on for protection of its assets, or that implement some of its services.

The Chip scope hardware may be a System-on-Chip or a System-in-Package, possibly supported by board level trusted subsystem components, for example, a Secure Element or Subscriber Identification Module.

The System software in the scope of the security evaluation executes in the Non-secure Processing Environment. System software evaluation dependencies on the Chip layer are detailed in section 2.4.

For the Device, the scope of the security evaluation includes the following software components:

* Applications and any other software developed by the OEM. These may execute in the Non-Secure Processing Environment or as Application Root of Trust Services in the Secure Processing Environment
* Configuration of the System software for the device.

Device evaluation dependencies on the System software and Chip layers are detailed in section 2.4.

## Roles for PSA Certified Level 1

PSA Certified Level 1 involves the following roles:

* Chip Vendor: Develops the chip, the immutable and updateable parts of the PSA-RoT (including any trusted subsystems).
* System software Vendor: Develops the system software for the Non-secure Processing Environment.
* Device OEM: Conceives and develops a device based on the PSA specifications.
* Evaluation Laboratory: Performs the technical review of questionnaire(s) submitted for PSA Certified Level 1 and if successful provides a digital certificate reference number (EAN-13) for the applicable evaluation scope.
* Certification Body: The entity that receives applications for PSA certification, issues certificates, maintains the security certification scheme, and ensures consistency across the evaluation laboratories.

## Options for Evaluation and Layer Composition

The purpose of PSA Certified Level 1 is to assess the security foundation of a device. The certification scheme is organized in layers: device, on top of the system software, on top of the chip. The certificate for a given layer is only applicable if the lower layers have either been separately evaluated and hold a PSA L1 certificate or, if not, are covered in the evaluation that lead to the considered certificate. The evaluation options are as follows;

1. Chip evaluation can proceed independently of the other layers. Section 4 must be filled in.
2. System software evaluation can proceed with one of the following;
   1. with a PSA Certified chip. Section 5 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the chip EAN-13.
   2. with an uncertified chip the evaluation must also include the chip part. Sections 4 and 5 must be filled in. Note that an independent certificate for the chip will not be issued.
3. Device evaluation can proceed with one of the following;
   1. on PSA Certified system software with either;
      1. a valid PSA Certified chip other than that declared in the system software certificate; see section 2.4.2 on validity. Section 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the system software EAN-13 and the PSA Certified chip EAN-13. Section 3.8 also must be filled in.
      2. the chip declared in the system software certificate. Section 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the system software EAN-13, and the named chip. If the named chip is PSA Certified, section 3.3 must give the chip EAN-13.
   2. on uncertified system software with a PSA Certified chip. The evaluation must include the system software part. Sections 5 and 6 must be filled in and section 3.3 must give the EAN-13 of the PSA Certified chip. An independent certificate for the system software will not be issued.
   3. if the chip is neither a valid PSA Certified chip (it does not have its own certificate) nor the chip named in any certificate for the System software[[6]](#footnote-7) then the evaluation must include both the system software and the chip parts. Sections 4, 5 and 6 must be filled in. Note that independent certificates for the system software and for the chip will not be issued.

Certification of a device requires the device vendor to confirm that the device and any device vendor configuration of the system software results in the correct use of the PSA-RoT. Confirmation is accessed via the device Developer responses in section 6. PSA Functional API certification can help in this process. Device evaluation is performed with a specific system software and chip combination, and the resulting device certificate is valid for that combination only.

### Options for submission directly to the PSA Certification Body

Where a product is developed from one already PSA Certified and the exact same questionnaire answers and declarations are applicable, then section 3.7 can be completed instead of the sections stated above and submitted directly to the PSA Certification Body. Checking for acceptablity with the PSA Certification Body or chosen Evaluation Laboratory is recommended. Section 3.7 can be used in the following situations;

* a new Chip uses the same certified PSA-RoT implemention,
* updated certified System Software on the same Chip declared in the referenced certification,
* a new device using the same System Software and Chip declared in the referenced certification.

### Valid Alternative PSA Certified Chips

Flexible composition via 3)a)i) above relies on the interchangeability of the chip level PSA-RoT. Typically, this means that the alternate PSA Certified chip must support at least the same PSA-RoT functionality as the chip named in the System software certificate. In practice, this likely means that all the requirements in section 4 must be met. PSA API Functional API Certification can be used as evidence of interchangeability.

If the PSA Certified System software relies on chip-level security functionality in addition to that required for the PSA-RoT then the alternative chip must provide at least the same additional functionality. In practice, this is likely to mean that such compositions may be difficult.

The full rules on validity can be found [here](http://www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/silicon-vendor/overview/level-1/questionnaire-composition)**.**

## Process for PSA Certified Level 1

The process for Level 1 certification is the following:

1. The Chip Vendor, the System software Vendor or the Device OEM (all named Developer below) complete the relevant questionnaire provided in sections 4, 5 or 6 as specified in section 2.4. It is recommended that the Developer also complete the assessible organisational best practices questions in Appendix A.1.
2. For each requirement in the relevant section, a single box corresponding to the fulfilment of the requirement is ticked (or marked in an equivalent way) as follows, note that a gray box means that answer is not acceptable. All guidance given in italic should be deleted.
   * + - Yes: for full compliance with the requirement, the Developer describes how this requirement is met according to any guidance given *in italic*.
       - Partial: for partial compliance with the requirement, the Developer describes how the requirement is partially met according to any guidance given *in italic* and what impact that has on the security.
       - N/A: where the requirement is not applicable for one of the following reasons, the Developer must in all cases provide a rationale;
         * the required feature is not supported (typically those requirements that start with “if”), or
         * is an Optional requirement and is not included.
3. The Developer fills the assessment information part in Section 3 and submits the applicable questionnaire(s), according to the selected scope of evaluation, to an Evaluation Laboratory.
4. The Evaluation Laboratory performs the technical review by checking that the rationale given for each requirement is consistent with the statement of the requirement. The Evaluation Laboratory may ask for clarification. The Evaluation Laboratory submits an application to the PSA Certification Body on behalf of the Developer.
5. If the result of the review by the Evaluation Laboratory is Pass, the Evaluation Laboratory will provide an EAN-13 for the relevant Chip, System software or Device certification (see section 2.4), if not already provided by the Developer.
6. The PSA Certification Body proceeds to the certification of the product and the EAN-13 is published along with product reference on the Body’s website.

The pass threshold for each section of Chip, System software or Device is at most 1 (one) question not answered in conformance with the “Expected answer” on the marking sheet of Appendix D with a rationale of why security is unaffected. Requirements marked as Optional must not be considered in the count.

For a variant of an existing certified product, the Developer can reuse the questionnaire that was reviewed by the Evaluation Laboratory provided exactly the same answers and declarations apply (see section 3.7). In that case, no action from an Evaluation Laboratory is required and the Developer only has to submit an application to the PSA Certification Body and outline how the changes do not impact the security relative to the original certified product. The EAN-13 for the new product will differ from the product already certified.

## Operational Environment Assumptions

The following assumptions hold regarding the operational environment of the device target of the evaluation:

* The device manufacturing process ensures integrity and authenticity of the hardware design and any software components.
* Generation, storage, distribution, destruction, injection of secret data in the device enforces integrity and confidentiality of these data. In particular, private keys are not shared among devices.
* The device and related software, including third-party libraries, is subject to a vulnerability watch and a responsible disclosure program. Vulnerabilities are subject to timely security patches and customers notified.
* The OEM has performed a risk assessment for the applications supported by the device to identify and protect assets used by the device, has followed coding best practices and has performed functional testing.

# Assessment Information

The vendor applying for PSA certification shall fill all applicable parts of this section.

## Contact

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Company activity:** | *(State whether OEM, System software Vendor or Chip Vendor)* |
| **Company name:** |  |
| **Contact name:** |  |
| **Contact title:** |  |
| **Contact email:** |  |
| **Contact address:** |  |
| **Contact phone:** |  |

## Scope of Evaluation

Check the box for the scope for this evaluation (see section 2.4):

* Chip.
* System software on a PSA Certified chip*.*
* System software on an uncertified chip.
* Device on PSA Certified system software but with a valid PSA Certified chip other than that named in the system software certificate. The declaration in section 3.8 must be completed.
* Device on PSA Certified system software with the chip named in the system software certificate.
* Device on an uncertified system software on a PSA Certified chip.
* Device on system software and on an uncertified chip*.*

## Product Reference

This declaration is applicable to the Chip;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Commercial name:** | *(e.g. Product family)* |
| **Chip part number:** |  |
| **Chip version:** | *(e.g. Chip silicon revision)* |
| **SPE name:** | *(e.g. Firmware Framework-M)* |
| **SPE version:** |  |
| **Chip EAN-13:** | *(If this version of the chip is already PSA Certified, specify the EAN-13 of the certificate)* |
| **Chip reference documentation:** | *(If this version of the chip is not PSA Certified, provide identification of the reference documentation used to fill the questionnaire, such as chip datasheet, detailed fact sheet or reference manual. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)* |
| **Vulnerability disclosure policy:** | *(If a vulnerability disclosure policy is available for this product, provide the URL it can be retrieved. See Appendix A.1.)* |

Additionally, for System software or Device evaluation this declaration is required;

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **System software name:** | *(e.g. Mbed OS, Linux)* |
| **System software version:** | The version number or an identifier for the build of the system software. |
| **System software EAN-13:** | *(If this version of the System software is already PSA Certified, specify the EAN-13 of the certificate)* |
| **System software reference documentation:** | *(If this version of the System software is not PSA Certified, provide identification of the reference documentation used to fill the System software questionnaire. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)* |
| **System Software use of chip security features:** | *(Please indicate what use, if any, is made of chip-level security functionality in addition to that required for the PSA-RoT. See section 2.4.2)* |

## 

## Device Product Description

This declaration applies for a Device evaluation.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Expected usage:** |  |
| **Features:** | *(Describe the functional and security features marketed for the product)* |
| **Description of expected operational environment:** | *(Describe if any actors and external resources are required for operation of the product, and the related security assumptions)* |

## PSA RoT Implementation

For Chip evaluation:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA functional API certified:** | *PSA Functional API Certification is optional.*  *If PSA API tests have been performed, then provide the output reports to the Evaluation Laboratory.* |
| **PSA Security Model Isolation Boundaries** | Isolation of the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) from the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE) is a mandatory PSA Certified requirement. The PSA Security Model [1] defines two incremental isolation boundaries; please indicate if these are deployed;   * The PSA-RoT is isolated from the Application RoT Service(s). * In addition to PSA-RoT isolation from Application RoT Service(s), Application RoT Services are isolated from each other. |
| **PSA-RoT Services:** | *(Describe PSA-RoT services implementation)* |
| **Trusted subsystem:** | *(Describe any trusted subsystems relied upon for operation of PSA Root of Trust, such as a security subsystem or a Secure Element, and how they are used. Declare ‘none’ if no trusted subsystems are used)* |
| **Entropy Source** | *(List any applied random number specification or conformance tests of the entropy source. This information will be included in the certificate.)* |

## 

## Declaration for new questionnaire

This declaration applies for a questionnaire that has not yet been reviewed by an Evaluation Laboratory.

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that:

1. The information provided in sections 4, 5, or 6, as required, of this questionnaire is valid and correct for the product/service stated in Section 3.3.

and

1. I acknowledge and accept the instructions, exclusions and other provisions set out in this document.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name:** |  |
| **Date:** |  |
| **Signature:** |  |

## Declaration for reuse of an existing questionnaire

This declaration applies for a product that reuses the exact same questionnaire answers and any declarations that have already been reviewed by an Evaluation Laboratory and for which the related product has passed PSA Certified. In that case, the Vendor does not have to fill again the relevant Section 4, 5, or 6 of this questionnaire and no action from an Evaluation Laboratory is required. The vendor can apply directly to the PSA Certification Body. See section 2.4.1.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EAN-13 of the product that passed PSA Certified:** |  |

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that:

1. The information provided in the questionnaire for the product referenced above that is PSA Certified is also valid and correct for the product/service stated in section 3.3.

and

1. I acknowledge and accept the instructions, exclusions and other provisions set out in this document.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name:** |  |
| **Date:** |  |
| **Signature:** |  |

## Declaration of conformance for a Device level certificate

If the Device developer is reusing a valid PSA Certified chip and PSA Certified system software for composition following 3)a)i) on page 13, the EAN-13 of the certificates should be declared below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified Chip EAN-13** |  |
| **PSA Certified System Software EAN-13** |  |

As an authorized representative of the organization stated in section 3.1 of this document, I declare that the information provided in this section is valid and correct for the product/service stated in section 3.3.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name:** |  |
| **Date:** |  |
| **Signature:** |  |

# Chip Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to the hardware and firmware that comprise the PSA-RoT that forms the Secure Processing Environment (SPE), see section 1.4. Skip this section if the version of the chip referred in Section 3.3 is already PSA Certified. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

When this section is filled by the System software Vendor or OEM, the answers apply only to the context in which the chip is used. For example, the response to C2.4 need list only the cryptographic algorithms used, not all the algorithms supported by the chip.

## Immutable Platform Root of Trust

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| C1.1 | The chip shall support a hardware mechanism(s) to isolate the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) from the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how isolation is implemented, for example through TrustZone or dual cores.)* | | | |
| C1.2 | The chip shall support Secure Boot, initiated from code in the immutable Platform Root of Trust, and which ensures device security in the event of a failure.  Note that asymmetric signing is expected, however, symmetric signing can be accepted if the requirement in C1.4 is met. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe which cryptographic functions and key sizes are used for secure boot, and how the cryptography is implemented, such as use of a hardware cryptographic accelerator or software in immutable code. Also describe how the Immutable code is implemented and if in some form updateable on-chip memory (such as EEPROM or Flash) how that is locked. Describe how a Secure Boot failure is handled and how the security of the device is maintained.)* | | | |
| C1.3  (Optional) | The chip shall support a security lifecycle, i.e. protecting critical security parameters and sensitive data based on device lifecycle state and enforcing the rules for transition between states, including any factory reset. In all cases the requirements of BP5.3 must be considered.  Lifecycle states can typically be classed as follows, i) non-secure assembly and test, ii) provisioning, secured provisioned and operational, iii) decommissioned, and iv) debug, if debug of a secured provisioned device is supported.  *NB: Security lifecycle is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of PSA Certified.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe supported lifecycle states and transition rules, and for each state, which critical Security Parameters, and any other sensitive data, is protected and how it is protected.)* | | | |
| C1.4 | The chip shall support the secure storage or derivation of following minimum set, or equivalent, of critical security parameters:   * A secret Hardware Unique Key (HUK), with at least with 128-bits of entropy, used for deriving other device secrets * A PSA-RoT Public Key, or hash of, used for authenticating the first updateable firmware component code during secure boot. If symmetric signing is unavoidable, the key must be unique per device. * An identifier or identifers that uniquely identifies the Immutable PSA-RoT of the chip, for example, manufacturer, part number, revision number, and identifies the specific instance.   If the chip supports attestation the chip shall also support the secure storage or derivation of the following, or equivalent, critical security parameters:   * A secret attestation key * An identifier that uniquely identifies the attestation key   The chip may support the secure storage of additional critical security parameters and sensitive data.  All critical security parameters must be protected against unauthorised modification, and the secret parameters protected also against unauthorised reading. Protection is required against software attacks and basic physical attacks such as probing of the external interfaces of the chip.  These keys and identifiers may be injected during chip manufacture or during the manufacture of the device, or derived from the HUK. They can also be derived from a Physically Unique Function (PUF). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe key size for each key, and if applicable the key derivation method for the Attestation Key. If HUK is derived from a PUF, provide a rationale of key uniqueness. Describe the protection of the functions to read the keys. Also describe how the chip data are protected from modification.)* | | | |

## PSA RoT

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| C2.1 | The PSA-RoT shall support update of the PSA-RoT and any Application RoTs. Updates may be delivered either from locally connected devices (such as removable media) or from remote servers.  Updates shall be validated by the PSA-RoT to check integrity and authenticity immediately prior to execution (see C1.2) and, optionally, at the time of download. This includes the executable code and any related data, such as configuration data, and version numbering.  The cryptography used shall comply with requirement C2.4. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how updates are validated, including the cryptographic algorithms, the key size and where the keys used for validation are stored. Justification is required if local validation of update from remote servers prior to installation cannot be supported, typically due to resource constraints.)* | | | |
| C2.2 (Optional) | The PSA-RoT shall prevent unauthorized rollback of updates (see C2.1) and protect the current reference firmware version number in an anti-rollback counter, in secure storage (for example, protected flash or OTP). A mechanism may be provided to support authorized rollback for recovery reasons.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V2.1.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the versioning information used to detect rollback and how it is protected in integrity and against rollback and over or underflow. If supported, describe how authorized rollback is implemented.)* | | | |
| C2.3 | The PSA-RoT shall perform authorised access control for modification and use of PSA-RoT critical security parameters and for System software or Device sensitive data managed by the PSA-RoT. For example, the PSA-RoT shall control access to any such data stored using the PSA Secure Storage service (or equivalent). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the System software subjects concerned by access control and how they are identified or authenticated)* | | | |
| C2.4 | The PSA-RoT shall use best practice cryptography for protection of its assets, as recommended, for example, by national security agencies. This includes the provision of a suitable source of random data. There should be no reliance on proprietary cryptographic algorithms or customization of standard cryptographic algorithms. PSA requires equivalence of at least 128-bit security level.  *NB: Weak cryptographic algorithms or key sizes may be available for specific uses (e.g. legacy) and with specific guidance. They shall not be used in any way that reduces the security of the best practice cryptography.*  *NB: A TRNG or a suitably seeded Deterministic Random Bit Generator can be used. The Developer should declare any conformance with random number specifications, for example NIST SP800-90B, for inclusion in the certificate.* |  |  |  |
| *(List the cryptographic algorithms provided by the PSA-RoT and the supported key sizes. Also describe how random number generation is performed.)* | | | |

# System Software Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to the software executing in the Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE), see section 1.4. Skip this section if the evaluation applies to the Chip only, or if the version of the System software on the chip referenced in Section 3.3 is already PSA-Certified. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

When this section is filled in by the System software vendor, it is acceptable to answer Yes to those requirements where the vendor provides the ability for the OEM to configure the device such that the OEM can meet the requirement. This situation arises where the system OEM, and not the software vendor, is responsible for the deployed configuration. The System software vendor should state that this is the case as the answer to the requirement.

When this section is filled in by the OEM, the provided answers apply only to the context in which the System software is used. For instance, the OEM may only provide in S2.3 the cryptographic algorithms that are used, not all the algorithms supported by the System software.

## Code Integrity

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S1.1 | The System software shall support update of the system software and the application specific software, either from locally connected devices (such as removable media) or from remote servers.  Updates shall be validated by the system software or the PSA-RoT to check the integrity and authenticity immediately prior to execution and, optionally, at the time of download. This includes the executable code and any related data, such configuration data and version numbering. The cryptography used shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how updates are validated, including the cryptographic algorithms, the key sizes and where the keys used for validation are stored. Justification is required if local validation of an update from remote servers prior to installation cannot be supported, typically due to resource constraints.)* | | | |
| S1.2 (Optional) | The System software shall prevent unauthorized rollback of updates to system software, any applicable application software and authentication data. A mechanism may be provided to support authorized rollback for recovery reasons.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V2.2.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the versioning information used to detect rollback and how it is protected in integrity and against rollback and overflow. If supported, describe how authorized rollback is implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

## Data Assets

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S2.1 | The System software shall rely only on the PSA-RoT for all queries of the PSA-RoT (chip) identity (see C1.4). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how the PSA-RoT identity is used in preference to other identities that may exist.)* | | | |
| S2.2 | The System software shall use secure storage to protect sensitive data and provide this functionality for application data. It shall additionally bind the sensitive data to a specific device instance and, if supported, security lifecycle state (see C1.3 and BP5.6).  The cryptography used for secure storage shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how secure storage is implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure storage service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |
| S2.3 | The System software shall use best practice cryptography as required by applicable standards or recommended by national security agencies, covering choice of algorithms, key lengths, random number generation, and generation of critical security parameters from low entropy sources, based on the identified threats.  There should be no reliance on proprietary cryptographic algorithms or customization of standard cryptographic algorithms.  This PSA Certified level requires equivalence of at least 128-bit security level. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the cryptographic algorithms provided by the System software, supported key sizes and how they are implemented. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT cryptographic service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

## Communication

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S3.1 | For two-way communication protocols and for each network interface, the System software shall provide the ability to authenticate remote devices and servers when establishing a connection. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S3.2 | The System software shall provide the ability to encrypt and integrity check data exchanged with remote devices and servers. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S3.3 | The System software shall use secure protocols, compliant with requirement S2.3, for authentication and encryption of two-way communication. The selected protocols shall not leak data that would lead to the identification of vulnerable devices.  *NB: If the System software relies on TLS, the version shall be 1.2 or later, and it shall forbid the fallback to legacy cipher suites publicly known to be unsecure (such as 3DES, DES, IDEA, RC4, or Null).* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. List the protocols used and if they are certified.)* | | | |

## Hardening

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S4.1 (Optional) | The System software shall support an attestation method that can be used to prove the genuineness of the device. If possible, the current security lifecycle state of the device should be included. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure attestation service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |
| S4.2 | Functionality that is not needed for the intended use of the System software shall not be installed, or shall be disabled if non-installation is not practical. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S4.3  (Optional) | The System software should provide logging of security relevant events and errors. The log should include sufficient detail to determine what happened and should be integrity protected.  *NB: Not all devices may support logging, due to constrained resources for instance. Logging is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of this document.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how logs are protected and how they can be retrieved if necessary)* | | | |
| S4.4 (Optional) | If the System software supports logging, it shall restrict access to the log files to authorized users only (refer to S5.3). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S4.5 | Data input via network and any other interfaces shall be validated defensively against malformed input.  *NB: System software level validation may be limited because any application specific validation may only be practical at the Device level, so is out of scope.*  Data transferred via critical system software Application Programming Interfaces (API) shall be validated defensively against malformed input. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S4.6 | If supported, the System software shall enable the execution of application specific software and system software with the lowest level of privilege necessary for the intended function.  Where supported, each authenticated user, application, process, etc., shall have limited privileges based on pre-determined and/or securely configurable access controls. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Passwords and Critical Security Parameters

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S5.1 | If the System software has a mechanism to reset passwords and critical security parameters they shall not be resettable to any universal factory default value. Such data must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S5.2 | If the System software makes use of passwords they should conform with security best practices, in particular, password length and complexity, and the number of failed authentication attempts (refer for instance to NIST SP 800-63B guidelines for memorized secrets).  Where default passwords are used, they must be unique per device and must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| S5.3 | If the System software makes use of critical security parameters for user authentication, the cryptography used for that feature shall comply with requirement S2.3. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes used for user authentication)* | | | |

## Configuration

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S6.1 | If the System software allows security-relevant configuration changes via a network or other interface, the related configuration change shall only be accepted after authentication (see S1.1, S3.1, S3.3 and S5.3).  Examples of security-relevant changes include:   * access control management for remote or local users, configuration of network keys, * passwords policy (such as changes or thresholds), update policy (such as query frequency, automatic installation, server address, rollback), * configuration of cryptography (such as default key length), access to network interfaces and authentication policy (such as account lock thresholds after failed authentication attempts). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Privacy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| S7.1 | If the System software allows persistent storage of personal configuration data it shall allow only the owner or an authorized entity to read and erase this data. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

# Device Assessment Questionnaire

This section applies to a device built on the System software (section 5) built on the Chip PSA-RoT (section 4). Skip this section if the scope of evaluation does not include the device. Instructions are given in section 2.5 on selection of one of “Yes”, “Partial” or “N/A” as the answer.

## Code Integrity

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Requirement** | | **Supported?** | | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** | |
| D1.1 | The device shall be configured to enforce Secure Boot for the PSA-RoT, any Application RoT Services and at least the first executable code of the NSPE System software, and which ensures device security in the event of a failure. | |  |  |  | |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Describe how a Secure Boot failure is handled and how the security of the device is maintained.)* | | | | | |
| D1.2 | The device shall be configured to ensure that the PSA-RoT and any Application RoT Services updates are performed in accordance with C2.1, and that any anti-rollback checks are performed in accordance with C2.2.  The device shall be configured to ensure that any system software and application software updates are performed, in accordance with S1.1, and that any anti-rollback checks are performed in accordance with S1.2.  *NB: Anti-rollback is strongly recommended but not mandatory in PSA Level 1 V2.2.* |  | |  | |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | | | |

## Communication

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D2.1 | The device shall close all logical interfaces not necessary for the intended use of the device.  Examples include, network TCP/UDP ports and/or sockets relating to services not required. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.2 | For two-way communication protocols, the device shall provide the ability to authenticate remote devices and servers when establishing a connection.  *NB: Protocols should be selected such that the process of authentication does not leak data that would lead to the identification of vulnerable devices.* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.3 | The device shall encrypt by default all data exchanged with remote devices and servers. Critical security parameters and any service or personal sensitive data shall always be encrypted. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D2.4 | The device shall use secure protocols, compliant to requirement S2.3, for authentication and encryption of two-way communication.  *NB: If the device relies on TLS, the version shall be 1.2 or later, and it shall forbid the fallback to legacy cipher suite publicly known to be unsecure (such as cipher suites with 3DES, DES, IDEA, RC4, or Null).* |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |

## Hardening

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | | **Partial** | **N/A** | |
| D3.1 | Deployed (production) devices shall be protected against unauthorised use of debug or test features, possibly with rules depending on device lifecycle state. Where debug is not permitted, debug symbols shall not be present in the code images on the device.  The device shall make inaccessible or erase sensitive user assets and credentials when these debug and test features are enabled. |  | |  |  | |
| *(Describe which technical measures disable or deactivate debug)* | | | | | |
| D3.2 (Optional) | The current security lifecycle state of the device shall be attestable, using, for example, an entity attestation token. |  | |  |  | |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | | | |
| D3.3 | Functionality that is not needed for the intended usage of the device shall not be installed or shall be disabled if non-installation is not practical. This can include software functionality as well as hardware features such as interfaces and test-points. |  | |  |  | |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | | | |
| D3.4  (Optional) | The device should support audit logging of security relevant events and errors and ensure only authorised read and/or write access to the logs.  The log should include enough details to determine what happened.  *NB: Not all devices may support logging, for example, due to constrained resources. Logging is currently not mandatory but will become a requirement in future revisions of this document.* |  | |  |  | |
| *(Describe how logs are protected and how they can be retrieved if necessary)* | | | | | |
| D3.5  (Optional) | If the device supports logging, it shall restrict access to log files to authorized users only. |  |  | |  | |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | | | |
| D3.6 | To ensure that the device has the necessary security properties, it and the System software shall make use of the PSA-RoT security functionality for at least one of the PSA-RoT secure storage, cryptography, and attestation services as necessary to meet the requirements in sections 4, 5 and 6. This is in addition to secure boot (see D1.1), and updates and anti-rollback (D1.2). |  |  | | |  |
| *(Describe how the PSA-RoT functionality is used on this device.)* | | | | | |

## Passwords and Critical Security Parameters

| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D4.1 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters, they shall be unique per device or defined by the user. They shall not be resettable to any universal factory default value and must not be easily determined by automated means or obtained from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.2 | If the device makes use of passwords, they should conform with security best practices, including, password length, complexity, generation of keys from passwords (in accordance with S2.3), and storage (for example, see NIST SP 800-63B guidelines for memorized secrets).  Where default passwords are used, they must be unique per device and must not be easily determined by automated means or from publicly available information. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.3 | If the device makes use of passwords, the device shall either disable passwords or apply a timeout after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts before another authentication attempt is allowed. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.4 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters for authorization, it shall implement an inactivity time-out or other appropriate mechanism to prevent perpetual authorization. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D4.5 | If the device makes use of critical security parameters, it shall use secure storage to protect them. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure storage service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

## Privacy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| D5.1 | If the device stores personal data, access to (and erasure of) that data, including that in any log files, should be to authorized users only (see S7.1 and BP5.6). |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met.)* | | | |
| D5.2 (optional) | Personal data shall be stored using PSA RoT secure storage. |  |  |  |
| *(Describe how this requirement is met. Note that use should be made of the PSA-RoT secure storage service for the most secure solution.)* | | | |

1. Best Practices

In addition to the technical security measures that are in the scope of Level 1 PSA certification covered in the requirements expressed in sections 4 to 6, this appendix lists many organizational, development and other best practices that contribute to comprehensive device security. These are collated from references ETSI 303645 [2], NIST8259A [3], SB-327 [4], UK DCMS [5], and Matter [6], and ioXt [7].

The best practices given in Appendix A.1 reflect common requirements that appear in many standards and are, or are likely to become, legal requirements in many territories. Verification of compliance to these organizational best practices by the Evaluation Laboratory during a PSA certification Level 1 evaluation is optional but recommended.

Appendices A.2 onwards categorise the best practices. Other than those in Appendix A.1, assessment is not performed by the Evaluation Laboratory during a PSA certification Level 1 evaluation.

* 1. Assessable Best Practices

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Requirement** | **Supported?** | | |
| **Yes** | **Partial** | **N/A** |
| BP2.2 (Optional) | The Developer should provide a public point of contact as part of its vulnerability disclosure policy, enabling externally identified vulnerabilities to be reported. |  |  |  |
| *(Optional notes)* | | | |
| BP3.3 (Optional) | The Developer should explicitly state the minimum length of time for which the device will receive security updates, or provide an expiration date after which security updates will not be issued. |  |  |  |
| *(Optional notes)* | | | |

* 1. Device Identification

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP1.1 | The device model designation should be easily visible to the end-user. |
| BP1.2 | The device identification number should be easily visible to the end-user. |

* 1. Vulnerability Disclosure

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP2.1 | The Developer should publish their vulnerability disclosure policy and response plan, which should be easily accessible from its website. |
| BP2.2 | The Developer should provide its public point of contact as part of its vulnerability disclosure policy, enabling externally identified vulnerabilities to be reported. See Appendix A.1. |
| BP2.3 | The Developer should act in a timely manner after discovery of a vulnerability, provide security updates and make them available to affected devices. |
| BP2.4 | The Developer should actively monitor for vulnerabilities likely to affect the security of its device and have a defined maintenance plan. |
| BP2.5 | The Developer should notify the end-user of known vulnerabilities, update availability and other possible mitigations. |

* 1. Update

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP3.1 | The device should install by default available updates. |
| BP3.2 | The device should check after initialization for available updates. |
| BP3.3 | The Developer should explicitly state the minimum length of time for which the device will receive security updates, or provide an expiration date after which security updates will not be issued. See Appendix A.1. |

* 1. Critical Security Parameters

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP4.1 | The Developer should ensure uniqueness for pre-installed Critical Security Parameters. |
| BP4.2 | The Developer should ensure that pre-installed Critical Security Parameters are generated with sufficient entropy. |
| BP4.3 | The Developer should follow a secure management process for the protection of Critical Security Parameters stored outside the device. |
| BP4.4 | The Developer should follow a secure management process for the generation and issuance of Critrical Security Parameters.FioXT |

* 1. Installation, Commissioning and Reset

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP5.1 | The Developer should design device installation and maintenance processes to employ minimal steps while ensuring security. |
| BP5.2 | The Developer should provide clear guidance to the end-user for device installation and maintenance. |
| BP5.3 | If the device requires any user installation or commissioning operation then that mode should automatically end if not completed within a specific time, or after a specific number of failed attempts. |
| BP5.4 | Information required for a user to install or commission a device should be hidden or removable from the device, or if performed electronically, for example over a wireless link, then that link must be protected in accordance with D2.4, in order to prevent an attacker performing an installation. |
| BP5.5 | Initiation of user installation or commissioning should require physical proximity and action by the user, such as pressing a button, that cannot be achieved remotely. |
| BP5.6 | Where a factory reset is is supported, all local data, including any keys and personal data, created through use by the end user must be erased, unless explicitly required to persist. |

* 1. Privacy

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Best practice** |
|
| BP6.1 | The Developer should inform the end-user when personal data is processed, by who and for which purpose, and obtain clear consent. |
| BP6.2 | The Developer should allow the end-user to withdraw at any time its content for processing of its personal data |
| BP6.3 | The Developer should provide clear instructions to the end-user on how to delete their personal data. |
| BP6.4 | The Developer should minimize and anonymize whenever possible the data collected from end-user logs. |

* 1. Development

| **ID** | **Best practice** |
| --- | --- |
|
|  |
| BP7.1 | The Developer should make use of development tools, for example, static code analysis, as part of a Security Design Lifecycle. |
| BP7.2 | The Developer should make use of available in-processor code hardening technologies that aim, for example, and not limited to;   * provide protection against stack smashing or overflow attacks, * enhance control flow integrity making it difficult for an attacker to mount call/jump and return orientated programming attacks, * make it difficult for an attacker to gain or escalate privilege * guard against memory safety violations, and so on. |
| BP7.3 | The Developer should ensure that the manufacturing process correctly and completely establishes and confirms that all the required security related controls and configuration have been set and the correct Critical Security Parameters have been used. |

* 1. Hardening

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Best practice** |
|
| BP8.1 | Battery powered devices should minimise the impact on battery life through excessive queries by rate limiting, possibly limiting the rate to zero, for periods of time. |

1. Mapping of PSA Certified to other Standards

The internet connected device and IoT domains are subject to several initiatives to improve device cybersecurity, from industry guidance to national regulation. While the scope of these initiatives is different from the one targeted for PSA Certified Level 1, this appendix aims at building a bridge between them. More precisely, for initiatives deemed relevant for PSA Certified Level 1, this appendix provides a mapping between other standards requirements and corresponding PSA Certified Level 1 requirements.

* 1. ETSI EN 303 645

The following table only considers the mandatory requirements from ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 standard, as per Table B.1 of [2], that have to be enforced by the device. Requirements that have be enforced by the environment of the device are not in the scope of PSA Certified Level 1.

| **ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.0 (2020-04) Provisions** | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| --- | --- |
| 5.1-1: Unique per device passwords | D4.1: Critical Security Parameters |
| 5.1.2: Automated password attacks | D4.2: Automated password attacks |
| 5.1-3: Cryptography for user authentication | S5.3: User authentication |
| 5.1-4: Change of authentication value | S6.1: Security configuration |
| 5.1-5: Authentication mechanism attack resilience | D4.2: Password best practices D4.3: Password threshold |
| 5.3-2: Mechanisms for secure updates | S1.1: Firmware update S1.2: Anti-rollback |
| 5.3-7: Best practice cryptography for updates | S1.1: Firmware update |
| 5.3-10: Trust relationship for updates | S1.1: Firmware update D2.2: Client-Server Authentication |
| 5.4-1: Sensitive parameter secure storage | S2.2: Secure storage |
| 5.4-2: Secure storage of ID | C1.4: ID storage |
| 5.4-3: Configurable security parameters | D4.1: Critical security parameter |
| 5.4-4: CSP unique per device resistant to automated attack | S5.1: CSP unique per device resistant to automated attack |
| 5.5-1: Secure communication | S3.3: TLS |
| 5.5-5: Authentication parameters configuration | S6.1: Configuration |
| 5.5-7: Sensitive data encryption over network | D2.3: Communication encryption |
| 5.6-1: Disable unused ports | D2.1: No unused port |
| 5.6-2: Minimize unauth disclosure | S3.3: Secure protocols that do not leak |
| 5.6-4: Software disable of debug interface | S4.2: Unneeded functionalities |
| 5.11-1: User data erasure | S7.1: Erase user data |
| 5.13-1: Input validation | S4.5: Input validation |

* 1. NISTIR 8259A

The following table considers the NIST cybersecurity baseline [3].

| **NISTIR 8259A Capabilities** | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| --- | --- |
| Device identification | C1.4 ID storage  S2.1 Device ID |
| Device configuration | C2.3 Access control PSA-RoT  S6.1 Configuration  S7.1 Factory settings |
| Data protection | C1.1 Isolation  C1.4 Secure storage  C2.4 Cryptography  S2.2 Secure storage  S2.3 Cryptography  S6.1 Configuration  S7.1 Erase user data  D5.2 Personal data |
| Logical access to interfaces | C2.3 Access control PSA-RoT  S3.1 Connection authentication  S3.2 Communication encryption  S3.3 TLS  S4.2 Unneeded functionalities  S4.5 Input validation  S6.1 Configuration  D2.1 No unused port  D2.2 Communication authentication  D2.3 Communication encryption  D2.4 TLS  D3.1 Debug  D3.3 Unneeded functionalities |
| Software and firmware update | C2.1 Firmware update  C2.2 Rollback  S1.1 Firmware update  S1.2 Rollback  S6.1 Configuration |
| Cybersecurity state awareness | C1.3 Security lifecycle  S4.1 Attestation  S4.3 Log  S4.4 Log protection  D1.1 Secure boot  D3.2 Security lifecycle  D3.4 Log  D3.5 Log protection  D5.1 Access control |

* 1. SB-327

The following table considers the requirements of California law [4] on cybersecurity of IoT devices.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **SB-327, SECTION 1, Title 1.81.26, 1798.91.04.** | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| (a)(1) Appropriate to the nature and function of the device. | PSA Certified requirements are targeted to IoT devices. |
| (a)(2) Appropriate to the information it may collect, contain, or transmit. | PSA Certified requirements on Code Integrity, Data Assets, Communication. |
| (a)(3) Designed to protect the device and any information contained therein from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. | PSA Certified requirements on Code Integrity, Data Assets, Communication, Passwords, Hardening, Privacy. |
| (b)(1) or (b)(2) | D4.1 No default password |

* 1. Matter

This appendix gives preliminary mappings to Matter [6] Security Requirements and Security Best Practice.

| **Matter Security Requirements** | | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Commissioning | 13.3 a | BP5.3 |
| 13.3 b | D4.2 |
| 13.3 c | BP5.3 |
| 13.3 d | C1.4, S4.1, D4.1 |
| 13.3 e | BP5.4 |
| 13.3 f | BP5.4 |
| Factory Reset | 13.4 a | BP5.6 |
| 13.4 b | C1.3, S2.2, D5.1, BP5.6 |
| Firmware | 13.5 a | D1.2 |
| 13.5 b | D1.2 |
| 13.5 c | S4.5 |

| **Matter Security Best Practices** | | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Crypto | 13.6.1 a | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 b | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 c | C1.1, C1.2, C1.3, C1.4, C2.3, C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 d | C2.4 |
| 13.6.1 e | D2.4 |
| Commissioning | 13.6.2 a | BP4.4 |
| 13.6.2 b | BP5.4 |
| 13.6.2 c | BP5.5 |
| 13.6.2 d | BP5.4 |
| 13.6.2 e | BP4.4 |
| 13.6.2 f | None |
| Firmware | 13.6.3 a | BP2.2 |
| 13.6.3 b | D1.1 |
| Manufacturing | 13.6.4 a | D1.1, D1.2, D2.1, D3.1, D3.3, BP7.3 |
| Resiliency | 13.6.5.a | C1.2, D1.1, D3.4 |
| Battery devices | 13.6.6 a | BP8.1 |
| Tamper resistance | 13.6.7 a | Influence which PSA Cert Level |
| Bridging | 13.6.8 | Not applicable |
| Distributed Compliance Register | 13.6.9 | Not applicable |

* 1. ioXt

This appendix gives preliminary mappings to the ioXt Baseline Profile certifiable requirements [7].

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **ioXt Baseline Profile certifiable requirement** | | **PSA Level 1 Requirements** |
| No Universal Passwords | UP1 | S5.1, S5.2 |
| Secured Interfaces | SI1.1 | S3.3 |
| SI1.2 | S4.2, D2.1, D3.1, D3.3 |
| SI1.3 | S3.1, D2.2, D2.4 |
| SI1.4 | S3.2, S3.3, D2.2, D2.3, D2.4 |
| Proven Crypto | PC1 | C2.4, S2.3, S5.3 |
| Verified Software | VS1 | BP2.3 |
| VS2 | C1.2 S1.1, D1.1, D1.2 |
| VS3 | C2.4 |
| Automatic Software Updates | AA1 | C2.1, S1.1 |
| AA2 | BP2.4 |
| AA3 | BP2.3 |
| Vulnerability Reporting | VDP1 | BP2.1 |
| VDP2 | BP2.2 |
| Security Expiration Data | SE1.1 | BP3.3 |
| SE1.2 | BP3.2 |

1. Changes Guide from V2.1 REL 02

This appendix lists the impact of changes between this revision and the V2.1 REL 02. Items marked “Unchanged” may include those with minor typographic corrections. Those marked “Clarification” aim to clarify the requirement through re-phrasing or the addition of supplementary information, but with no intended change to the requirement. Those marked “New” have been added in this version. Those marked “Extended” means that requirement has new elements that may be applicable.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **L1 V.2.2** | **Changes from v2.1 REL 2** | |
| C1.1 | Unchanged |  |
| C1.2 |  | Clarification |
| C1.3 |  | Extended |
| C1.4 |  | Clarification |
| C2.1 |  | Clarification |
| C2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| C2.3 |  | Clarification |
| C2.4 | Unchanged |  |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **L1 V.2.2** | **Changes from v2.1 REL 2** | |
| S1.1 |  | Clarification |
| S1.2 |  | Clarification |
| S2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S2.3 |  | Clarification |
| S3.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S3.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S3.3 |  | Extended |
| S4.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.4 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.5 | Unchanged |  |
| S4.6 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.1 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.2 | Unchanged |  |
| S5.3 | Unchanged |  |
| S6.1 | Unchanged |  |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **L1 V.2.2** | **Changes from v2.1 REL 2** | |
| D1.1 |  | Clarification |
| D1.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.3 | Unchanged |  |
| D2.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.2 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.3 |  | Clarification |
| D3.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.5 | Unchanged |  |
| D3.6 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.2 |  | Clarification |
| D4.3 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.4 | Unchanged |  |
| D4.5 | Unchanged |  |
| D5.1 | Unchanged |  |
| D5.2 | Unchanged |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **L1 V.2.2** | **Changes from v2.1 REL 2** | | |
| BP1.1 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP1.2 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP2.1 |  |  | Clarification |
| BP2.2 |  |  | Clarification |
| BP2.3 |  |  | Clarification |
| BP2.4 |  |  | Clarification |
| BP2.5 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.1 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.2 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP3.3 |  |  | Clarification |
| BP4.1 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.2 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.3 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP4.4 | New |  |  |
| BP5.1 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.2 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP5.3 | New |  |  |
| BP5.4 | New |  |  |
| BP5.5 | New |  |  |
| BP5.6 | New |  |  |
| BP6.1 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.2 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.3 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP6.4 |  | Unchanged |  |
| BP7.1 | New |  |  |
| BP7.2 | New |  |  |
| BP7.3 | New |  |  |
| BP8.1 | New |  |  |

1. Marking Sheet

This appendix summarizes the expected answers for each requirement in the Chip, System software and Device questionnaires for compliance to PSA Certified Level 1 and also for additional compliance to the other standards considered in the document.

* 1. Chip Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally, one mandatory question answered not in conformance with “Expected answer” with rationale of why security is unaffected.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| C1.1 Hardware isolation of SPE | Only “Yes” |
| C1.2 Secure Boot | “Yes” |
| C1.3 (Optional) Security lifecycle support | Any Answer |
| C1.4 Secure storage of keys | “Yes” |
| C2.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| C2.2 (Optional) Rollback protection | Any Answer |
| C2.3 Access control for modifications to PSA-RoT | “Yes” |
| C2.4 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| C1.4 ID Storage | “Yes” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| C1.1 Hardware isolation of SPE | “Yes” |
| C1.3 Security lifecycle | “Yes” |
| C1.4 ID Storage | “Yes” |
| C2.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| C2.2 Rollback protection | “Yes” |
| C2.3 Access control for modifications to PSA-RoT | “Yes” |
| C2.4 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |

* 1. System Software Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally: One mandatory question answered not in conformance with “Expected answer” with rationale of why security is unaffected.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| S1.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 (Optional) Prevent rollback | Any Answer |
| S2.1 Use PSA-RoT for ID queries | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Use secure storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best practice crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.1 Authenticate remote servers | “Yes” |
| S3.2 Ability to encrypt data exchanged | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g., TLS >= v1.2 | “Yes” |
| S4.1 (Optional) Attestation method of lifecycle state | Any Answer |
| S4.2 Disable/not install unused functionality | “Yes” |
| S4.3 (Optional) System software should log security events | Any Answer |
| S4.4 (Optional) If logging enabled, restrict access of log files to auth users only | Any Answer |
| S4.5 Input protected against malformed input | “Yes” |
| S4.6 If supported, Lowest privilege necessary | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.1 If using critical security parameters, they are unique per device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 If using passwords then best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.3 If using user auth then crypto is best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 If security config changeable – auth first | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 If personal data stored it should be erasable /device reset | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| --- | --- |
| S1.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 Prevent unauth rollback | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Secure Storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best Practice Crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g. TLS >= v1.2 | “Yes” |
| S4.2 Functionality not needed is not installed | “Yes” |
| S4.5 Input validation | “Yes” |
| S5.1 CSP Unique per Device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 If Passwords, then best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.2 Passwords best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S5.3 User Auth | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 Configuration | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 Erase user data | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| --- | --- |
| S1.1 Firmware update | “Yes” |
| S1.2 Prevent rollback | “Yes” |
| S2.1 Use PSA-RoT for ID queries | “Yes” |
| S2.2 Use secure storage | “Yes” |
| S2.3 Best practice crypto | “Yes” |
| S3.1 Authenticate remote servers | “Yes” |
| S3.2 Ability to encrypt data exchanged | “Yes” |
| S3.3 Two-way comms use secure protocols for auth and encryption e.g. TLS v1.2 or later | “Yes” |
| S4.1 Attestation token of lifecycle state | “Yes” |
| S4.2 Disable/not install unused functionality | “Yes” |
| S4.3 System software should log security events | “Yes” |
| S4.4 Restrict access of log files to auth users only | “Yes” |
| S4.5 Input protected against malformed input | “Yes” |
| S5.2 Passwords best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S6.1 Security config changeable – auth first | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| S7.1 Personal data erasable /device reset | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* 1. Device Assessment Questionnaire
     1. PSA Certified Level 1

Exceptionally: One mandatory question answered not in conformance with “Expected answer” with rationale of why security is unaffected.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| D1.1 Secure boot with validated software | “Yes” |
| D1.2 PSA-RoT is updateable | “Yes” |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D2.4 The device shall use secure protocols for authentication and encryption of two-way communication | “Yes” |
| D3.1 Protect against unauthorized use of debug | “Yes” |
| D3.2 (Optional) Security lifecycle attestable | Any Answer |
| D3.3 Functionalities not needed disabled or not installed | “Yes” |
| D3.4 (Optional) Log security events | Any Answer |
| D3.5 (Optional) If log, restrict log files to auth users | Any Answer |
| D3.6 Use of PSA-RoT Services | “Yes” |
| D4.1 If critical security params then unique per device | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.2 If passwords, device uses password best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.3 If passwords, ability to disable passwords or apply time out after unsuccessful auth against a password | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.4 If auth, time-out against perpetual auth | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.5 If critical security params then secure storage | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D5.1 Restrict access to personal data/logs to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D5.2 (Optional) Personal data stored on PSA-RoT secure storage | Any Answer |

* + 1. ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.0 Mapping

| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| --- | --- |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D4.2 Device uses password best practice | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D4.3 Ability to disable passwords or apply time out after unsuccessful auth against a password | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. NISTIR 8259A Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| D1.1 Secure boot with validated software | “Yes” |
| D2.1 Close unused network ports/interfaces | “Yes” |
| D2.2 Ability to auth remote servers | “Yes” |
| D2.3 Encrypt by default data exchanged | “Yes” |
| D2.4 The device shall use secure protocols for authentication and encryption of two-way communication | “Yes” |
| D3.1 Protect against unauthorized use of debug | “Yes” |
| D3.2 Security lifecycle attestable | “Yes” |
| D3.3 Functionalities not needed disabled or not installed | “Yes” |
| D3.4 Log security events | “Yes” |
| D3.5 Restrict log files to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D5.1 Restrict access to personal data/logs to auth users | “Yes” or “N/A” |
| D5.2 (Optional) Personal data stored on PSA-RoT secure storage | “Yes” or “N/A” |

* + 1. SB-327 Mapping

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PSA Certified L1 v.2.1** | **Expected answer** |
| D4.2 Device uses password best practice | “Yes” |

* + 1. Marking Sheet Summary

| PSA Level 1 pass? | Answer |
| --- | --- |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – System software pass achieved? |  |
| PSA Certified Level 1 – Device pass achieved? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 System software section pass achieved? |  |
| ETSI EN 303 645 Device pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A Chip section pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A System software section pass achieved? |  |
| NISTIR 8259A Device section pass achieved? |  |
| SB-327 mapping pass achieved? |  |

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proposals-for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views/proposals-for-regulating-consumer-smart-product-cyber-security-call-for-views [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. <https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The isolation between the Non-Secure Processing Environment and the Secure Processing Environment can be implemented using, for example, TrustZone, using dual cores, or via processor privilege levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The Updateable Platform Root of Trust may also execute any Application specific Root-of-Trust services, but these are not in the scope of a Chip certification. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. A System software certificate is only applicable with a valid PSA Certified chip or the chip named in the certificate. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)